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The European Union has perfect, legally enforceable human rights
obligations towards distant strangers, i.e. noncitizens outside of the terri-
tory of its member states. These include “positive” obligations to “protect”
and “fulfill,”—that is, to prevent third parties from causing human rights
violations, and to establish mechanisms for the vindication of those
rights—rather than just “negative” obligations to “respect” human rights.
The argument has two limbs: (1) in order to achieve its goals in numerous
policy areas, the European Union asserts not just power extraterritorially,
but authority; and (2) the entire spectrum of human rights obligations po-
tentially arises from relationships of political authority and obedience.
Section I begins by setting out certain provisions added by the Lisbon
Treaty requiring the European Union to promote human rights, democ-
racy, and the rule of law in all its “relations with the wider world.”1 Sec-
tion II then recounts a recent interpretation of these provisions, which
understands them primarily as mandating compliance with international
law, and thus largely denies extraterritorial human rights obligations to
protect. While the fundamentals of this “compliance” reading are correct,
Section III demonstrates that the notion of international law involved here
entertains an expansive view of prescriptive jurisdiction, that is, a political
institution’s authority to prescribe rules binding conduct. Indeed, despite
precedent from the General Court2 claiming otherwise, the European
Union regularly creates legal effects outside its borders, and has always
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1. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 3(5), Oct. 26, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326) [hereinafter TEU].
2. The General Court is the lower instance of the EU judiciary. Decisions by the
General Court are appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). See
Court of Justice of the European Union – Overview, EUROPA, http://bit.ly/1CikNl1 (last vis-
ited Aug. 1, 2016).
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done so. This is reflected both in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU), as well as in EU legislation, particularly
in areas such as competition, financial, and environmental regulation, all
of which have profound implications for the human rights of distant
strangers.
Section IV argues, from a premise of human dignity as lying in auton-
omy, that human rights obligations arise only in relations of political au-
thority, not mere factual power. By reference to Strasbourg case-law on
extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction, it demonstrates that the creation
of legal effects abroad is both necessary and sufficient to give rise to
human rights obligations there, and rejects accounts of human rights juris-
diction based upon aspects of factual power, such as the “state control”
and “capability” theories. If, as this paper argues, the European Union
regularly governs persons overseas, this raises the specter of imperialism,
which is touched upon in the conclusion.
I. THE PROVISIONS
The provisions grounding the forthcoming argument are scattered
throughout the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).3 Article 3(5) of the TEU,
the first of these, provides that
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and
promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection
of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protec-
tion of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as
to the strict observance and the development of international law,
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
Situated in the “Common Provisions” of Title I, this provision is of plenary
application across all EU policy areas. The “values” in the first sentence
are specified in Article 2 of the TEU as “respect for human dignity, free-
dom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.”
3. Note that ordinary rules of treaty interpretation do not apply. EU treaties have
from the very beginning been subjected to ‘dynamic’, ‘purposive’ or ‘teleological’ methods of
interpretation aimed at ensuring their effet utile and effectiveness. See Miguel Poiares
Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Plu-
ralism, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-4 (2007); JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 68-80 (2002) (citing Case 8/55 Fédération Charbonnière de
Belgique v. High Authority, 1954–6 E.C.R. 292; Case 22/70, Comm’n v. Council (ERTA),
1971 E.C.R. 273); Treaty on European Communities art. 300 [hereinafter TEC], now re-num-
bered by the Treaty of Lisbon as TFEU art. 352, at Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union art. 352, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 196.
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Secondly, Article 21(1) of the TEU, located in the chapter on external
relations, provides that,
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by
the principles which have inspired its own creation, development
and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider
world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibil-
ity of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for
the principles of the United Nations Charter and international
law.
Article 21(2) of the TEU provides that the European Union “shall define
and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree
of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to . . . consol-
idate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the princi-
ples of international law;”4 “foster the sustainable economic, social and
environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim
of eradicating poverty;”5 and “promote an international system based on
stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.”6
Finally, Article 21(3) of the TEU states that,
The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives
set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementa-
tion of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered
by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, and of the external aspects of its other
policies.
The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of
its external action and between these and its other policies. The
Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure
that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.
The first paragraph governs more than just the European Union’s external
policies, but not the purely internal. The phrase “external aspects of [the
European Union’s] other policies” refers to such things as the “external
dimension” of competition law, for example, chapters on EU competition
4. TEU art. 21(2)(b) (emphasis added).
5. TEU art. 21(2)(d). Subsections (b) and (d) have featured prominently in the EU
sanctions regime, having been invoked by the General Court to express ‘objectives of general
interest’ justifying the limitation of the right to property under Article 17(1) of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. See, e.g., Case T-256/11, Ezz and Others v. Council, 2014
ECLI:EU:T:2014:93, ¶ 199 (aff’d Case 220/14, Ezz and Others v. Council, 2015
ECLI:EU:C:2015:147); Case T-133/12, Ben Ali v. Council, 2014 ECLI:EU:T:2014:176, ¶¶ 48,
70. See also Case T-119/11, Gbagbo v. Council, 2013 ECLI:EU:T:2013:216, ¶ 77 (aff’d C-397/
13 P, Gbagbo v. Council, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:46) (citing Article 21(1) TEU as a standard
for evaluating abuses of power).
6. TEU art. 21(2)(h).
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rules in bilateral agreements.7 The second paragraph, however, introduces
a principle of consistency or coherence applicable across external policy
and the European Union’s “other,” that is, internal policies, thus blurring
the line between the internal and external. One objection should be dis-
patched at this point. Enzo Cannizzaro argues that Article 21 of the TEU
is limited to the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) pillar, on
the basis that “Article 23 [of the TEU] assigns the pursuit of the political
objectives laid down by Article 21(1) and (2) to the primary competence
of the CFSP.”8 Lorand Bartels responds correctly that this is a misreading
of Article 23 of the TEU, which provides that the conduct of the CFSP
“shall be guided by the principles, shall pursue the objectives of, and be
conducted in accordance with” the general provisions on EU external rela-
tions, such as Article 21 of the TEU. This cannot be read to mean the
CFSP is the only means by which the political objectives in Article 21 of
the TEU are to be pursued.9
What implications do these provisions have for legal relations between
the EU and distant strangers? Although they were initially dismissed as
aspirational and “redolent of motherhood and apple pie,”10 this is no
longer tenable because of the Air Transport Association of America
(ATAA)11 judgment, which will be discussed below. Consider two semi-
hypothetical scenarios, both concerning the right to food. Firstly, when
formulating agricultural policy, does the European Union have to take
into account the effects of subsidies upon developing country farmers?
Secondly, imagine a merger planned between two supermarket chains.
The merger will not affect consumer welfare within the European Union,
but will likely result in the creation of an entity with monopsony power in
downstream markets for coffee, tea, and other commodities located in de-
veloping countries. Its monopsony power may be so great that it deprives
farmers of the ability to earn enough income to buy adequate food and
7. Anne-Marie van den Bossche, EU Competition Law in 3D, in THE EUROPEAN
UNION IN THE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARC MARESCEAU, 365, 372-78 (Inge
Govaere et al. eds., 2014).
8. Enzo Cannizzaro, The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with
Extraterritorial Effects: A Reply to Lorand Bartels, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1093, 1098 (2014).
9. Lorand Bartels, The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with
Extraterritorial Effects: Rejoinder to Enzo Cannizzaro, EJIL: TALK, DEBATE! (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/rejoinder-to-enzo-cannizzaro/. See also opinions of Advocate General
Kokott in Case C-263/14, Parliament v. Council, 2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:729, ¶ 72 (citing Arti-
cles 21(1), 21(2)(b), and 21(3) of the TEU to opine that the “rule of law and protection of
human rights are, in general, among the principles governing the Union’s external action
which are to be observed and implemented not only, but also within the framework of the
CFSP. . .”), and Advocate General Bot in Case C-658/11, Parliament v. Council,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:41, ¶¶ 85-90 (Jan. 30, 2014); Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, 2012
ECLI:EU:C:2012:50, ¶¶ 62-64 (the provisions of Article 21(2) of the TEU bind all EU exter-
nal action, including the CFSP).
10. ALAN DASHWOOD ET AL., WYATT AND DASHWOOD’S EUROPEAN UNION LAW 903
(2011) (describing Article 21(1) TEU).
11. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of America v. Sec’y of State for Energy and
Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-02735.
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health care, or to send their children to school.12 What if one of these
developing countries—call it Ruritania—champions the merger despite its
devastating effects upon rural communities, because it has embarked on
an economic policy of industrial development? Suppose Ruritania is not
party to any applicable human rights treaties. What should the Commis-
sion (the European Union merger regulator) do? Should it approve the
merger, or regulate it?
II. THE COMPLIANCE READING
In a recent article, Bartels argues that the provisions (1) require the
human rights norms internally applicable in the European Union to be
respected by it in its external conduct,13 and (2) mandate compliance with
international law by turning international human rights norms into norms
of EU law binding upon EU institutions and actions.14 As such, the provi-
sions regulate the European Union’s own conduct, rather than those of
third parties. He thus concludes that negative obligations to respect
human rights apply universally, whereas positive obligations to protect and
to fulfill are limited to EU territory.
The first limb of Bartels’ analysis concerns EU law. He argues that the
provisions, particularly the first indent of Article 21(3) of the TEU, im-
pose obligations under EU law that prohibit the European Union, say,
from imposing sanctions upon a third country if it would cause starvation
there, or from entering into an agreement with another state to spy on its
citizens in violation of that state’s human rights obligations. However, re-
garding obligations to protect and fulfill, Bartels finds the provisions to be
“much more muted.”15 Articles 3(5) and 21(1) of the TEU require that the
European Union “contribute” to the advancement of human rights, and
that its action on the international scene be “guided” by the principles of
the universality and indivisibility of the same. Such language conceivably
only gives rise to obligations to cooperate internationally, for instance
through intergovernmental and civil society channels. Because the provi-
sions do not specify any particular manner by which the European Union
is to achieve these ends, Bartels considers them legally unenforceable.16
12. See, e.g., Tristan Feunteun, Cartels and the Right to Food: An Analysis of States’
Duties and Options, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 341, 342 (2015); Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the
Monopsony in the Mirror, 62 EMORY L.J. 1509, 1510-11 (2013); Olivier De Schutter (Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Briefing Note 03: Addressing Concentration in Food Sup-
ply Chains: The Role of Competition Law in Tackling the Abuse of Buyer Power (Dec. 2010);
Olivier De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. to the 13th Session of
the Human Rights Council: Agribusiness and the right to food, ¶¶ 8–9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/
33, 3 (Dec. 22, 2009); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: Agriculture for
Development 135-37 (2007).
13. Lorand Bartels, The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with
Extraterritorial Effects, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1074-75 (2014).
14. Id. at 1078-87.
15. Id. at 1074.
16. Id. at 1075.
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Bartels’ second limb deals with international law, arguing that “the
EU is also required to respect international human rights obligations to
the extent these are binding on the EU under treaties or customary inter-
national law.”17 The theme of compliance is emphasized in numerous EU
official and judicial pronouncements. For instance, a December 2011 Joint
Communication by the Commission and CFSP High Representative (Joint
Communication) states that “EU external action has to comply with the
rights contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which became
binding EU law under the Lisbon Treaty, as well as with the rights guaran-
teed by the European Convention on Human Rights.”18 Moreover, the
General Court in Kadi II hinted at the idea when it cited Articles 3(5),
21(1) and (2) of the TEU, and Declaration No. 13 annexed to the Lisbon
Treaty, in the course of observing that “some” had expressed “certain
doubts” as to whether the CJEU’s Kadi I judgment was in compliance
with international law.19 However, by far the most important authority
relied upon for the compliance reading is the ATAA decision, where the
CJEU observed that “[u]nder Article 3(5) TEU, the European Union is to
contribute to the strict observance and the development of international
law,” and relied upon this as grounds for finding that “when it adopts an
act, [the European Union] is bound to observe international law in its en-
tirety, including customary international law, which is binding upon the
institutions of the European Union.”20
From this premise, Bartels denies extraterritorial positive human
rights obligations, reasoning that if the provisions are about mandating
compliance with international law and international human rights law,
there can be no obligation to protect human rights from violation by third
parties extraterritorially, because neither international law nor interna-
tional human rights law requires this.21 Bartels tenders two arguments to
this end, while this Article anticipates the third: (1) states do not acquire
extraterritorial human rights obligations as a result of the mere extraterri-
torial effects of their domestic policy; (2) actions of third parties cannot be
attributed to states or international organizations (IOs) in the absence of
intentional assistance, direction, control, or adoption;22 and (3) any mea-
sures to protect the human rights of distant strangers may constitute inter-
ference with the sovereign rights of the states in which the affected
individuals are situated. Thus, while the provisions allow the European
17. Id. at 1078.
18. European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, Communication on Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of
EU External Action—Towards a More Effective Approach, at 7, COM (2011) 886 final (Dec.
12, 2011).
19. T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II–5177, ¶ 115 (discussing Joined Cases C-
402/05 P and C-415/05 P. Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351).
20. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of America, 2011 E.C.R., ¶ 101; see also id. ¶
123.
21. See infra Section II(A)-(C).
22. See infra Section II(A) & (B).
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Union to promote and advance its human rights agenda throughout the
world, this is to be carried out multilaterally through political channels.
In addition, Bartels raises the issue of standing for judicial review
under EU law, which in his view closes off any opportunity for distant
strangers to challenge measures in violation of even the limited obligations
provided by the compliance reading.23
The compliance reading possesses considerable support in academic
commentary and beyond. For instance, a piece written before the ATAA
decision describes Article 21 of the TEU as espousing a “liberal institu-
tionalist school of international relations,” preferring international cooper-
ation to approaches that may lead to conflict,24 while a piece from 2008
considers that the “substantive [external] mandate as expressed in Article
3(5) TEU is to be achieved by developing relations and building partner-
ships with third countries and international organisations which share the
Union’s principles and values, and promoting multilateral solutions to
common problems [as required by] (Article 21(1) TEU).”25
In the following paragraphs, this Article canvasses the four arguments
against positive extraterritorial human rights obligations as postulated by
the compliance reading.
A. Human Rights Jurisdiction
As a rule, a state bears responsibility for the protection of human
rights only within its “human rights jurisdiction,” traditionally identified
with territorial control, on the basis of the Namibia opinion.26 This applies
equally across civil and political rights, as contained in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and socioeconomic
rights. For instance, in the Wall opinion, the ICJ explained the unique lack
of a jurisdictional stipulation in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)27 as arising from “the fact that this
Covenant guarantees rights which are essentially territorial . . .”28 While
the Court opined that Israel had obligations under the ICESCR for events
23. See infra Section II(D).
24. MICHAEL EMERSON ET AL., UPGRADING THE EU’S ROLE AS GLOBAL ACTOR: IN-
STITUTIONS, LAW AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 16 (2011).
25. Marise Cremona, Coherence through Law: What Difference will the Treaty of Lis-
bon Make?, 3 HAMBURG REV. SOC. SCI. 11, 35 (2008).
26. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 131 (June 21). While the ICJ spoke only of
South Africa’s obligations as the former mandatory power in the territory, scholars view this
pronouncement as beginning the debate on the extraterritorial application of human rights
obligations. See Ralph Wilde, Human Rights beyond Borders at the World Court: The Signifi-
cance of the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence on the Extraterritorial Application
of International Human Rights Law Treaties, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 639, 643, 661 (2013).
27. See International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 14
(mentioning territorial jurisdiction when enumerating the obligation of progressive imple-
mentation of a plan of free compulsory education).
28. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶¶ 111-13 (July 9).
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occurring in the Occupied Territories, it emphasized that the norms in the
ICESCR, ICCPR, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
applied extraterritorially only if the relevant extraterritorial acts were car-
ried out “in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside of its own territory.”29
Currently, the most cited monograph on extraterritorial human rights ju-
risdiction deems most positive human rights obligations inapplicable in the
absence of territorial control, on the grounds that they are incapable of
being fulfilled effectively.30 Thus, human rights jurisdiction boils down to
presence in foreign territory, presumably involving “boots on the
ground.”31
Certainly, numerous treaty bodies hold that the creation of substantial
and foreseeable effects gives rise to human rights jurisdiction.32 However,
their pronouncements suffer from problems of content and status. Some
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESR) General
Comments are couched in terms of an exhortatory “should” rather than a
prescriptive “must,” a choice Bartels considers significant.33 Moreover,
while academics and activists invoke these statements promiscuously,
29. Id. ¶ 111; see also Application of the International Convention of the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geo. v. Rus.), Provisional Measures, Judgment, 2008
I.C.J. 353, ¶¶ 109, 149 (Oct. 15) (holding the Convention on the Elimination on all Forms of
Racial Discrimination applicable to extraterritorial state acts and ordering Georgia and Rus-
sia to do “all in their power to ensure that public authorities and public institutions under
their control or influence do not engage in acts of racial discrimination.”); Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶
219 (Dec. 19) (applying same reasoning with respect to the ICCPR and the CRC).
30. MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREA-
TIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011). See infra Section IV(C)(2).
31. Samantha Besson, The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human
Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to, 25
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 857, 868 (2012).
32. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Econ. Soc. and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Com-
ment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, ¶ 36 (May 12, 1999)
(“In implementing this commitment [to take joint and separate action to achieve the full
realization of the right to adequate food], States parties should take steps to respect the
enjoyment of the right to food in other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to
food and to provide the necessary aid when required.”); U.N. Comm. on Econ. Soc. and
Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Stan-
dard of Health (Article 12 of the ICESCR), 51, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, ¶ 39 (Aug. 11,
2000) (“States parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries,
and to prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to
influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Char-
ter of the United Nations and applicable international law.”); U.N. Comm. on Econ. Soc. and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, ¶
31 (Jan. 20, 2003) (“International cooperation requires States parties to refrain from actions
that interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in other coun-
tries. Any activities undertaken within the State party’s jurisdiction should not deprive an-
other country of the ability to realize the right to water for persons in its jurisdiction.”).
33. Bartels, supra note 13, 1085-86. General Comment No. 14 on the right to health,
supra note 32, does not mention “should.”
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courts and governments have always remained more skeptical of them.34
For instance, they have almost never been cited by the ICJ. A rare excep-
tion was in Diallo, where the Court described General Comment No. 15 of
the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) as having “great weight.” How-
ever it immediately emphasized that it was “in no way obliged, in the exer-
cise of its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation of the
[ICCPR] on that of the [HRC] . . . .”35 The situation in domestic or re-
gional tribunals is similar, if not more dire. In Grootboom, the South Afri-
can Constitutional Court paid lip service to the CESR’s General Comment
No. 3 laying down the “minimum core” doctrine,36 but then disparaged it
significantly, eventually rejecting its approach to construing the right to
adequate housing under the South African Constitution.37 Other treaty
bodies have fared even worse. About the U.N. Torture Committee, Lord
Bingham in the House of Lords noted that “the Committee is not an ex-
clusively legal and not an adjudicative body; its power . . . is to make gen-
eral comments . . . Whatever its value in influencing the trend of
international thinking, the legal authority of this recommendation is
slight.”38 In his speech in the same case, Lord Hoffman bluntly declared
the following: “as an interpretation of article 14 [of the U.N. Torture Con-
vention] or a statement of international law, I regard it as having no
value.”39
Crucially, the Strasbourg Court rejected a human rights “effects doc-
trine” in Banković, holding that, “from the standpoint of public interna-
tional law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily
territorial,”40 and “the applicant’s submission [was] tantamount to arguing
that anyone adversely affected by an act imputable to a Contracting State,
34. See, e.g., Rep. of the Standing Senate Comm. on Human Rights, Promises to Keep:
Implementing Canada’s Human Rights Obligations (2001) (Can.), http://www.parl.gc.ca/Con-
tent/SEN/Committee/371/huma/rep/rep02dec01-e.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (“[T]he
views and decisions of these treaty-monitoring bodies are not binding on Canada, either
under international or domestic law.”); NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RE-
PORT NO. 21 TO THE STORTING (1999-2000), Focus on Human Dignity-A Plan of Action for
Human Rights, chapter 4, Box 4.2, https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/stmeld-nr-21-
1999-2000-/id192704/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (“[T]he recommendations and criticism of the
monitoring committees are not legally binding, but they are given great weight by the Norwe-
gian authorities. . . .”), [Overvåkningkomiteenes anbefalinger og kritikk er ikke rettslig
bindende, men de blir tillagt stor vekt av norske myndigheter, og inngår som en viktig prem-
iss i et kontinuerlig arbeid for å sikre en lojal gjennomføring av menneskerettighetskonvens
jonene].
35. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 639,
¶ 66 (Nov. 30).
36. U.N. Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Rep. on the Fifth Session, Supp.
No. 3, Annex III, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1991).
37. Gov. of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at ¶
33 (S. Afr.).
38. Jones v. Ministry of Interior for Saudi Arabia (2006) UKHL 26, [2007], 1 A.C.
(HL) 270, ¶ 23 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
39. Id. ¶ 56.
40. Banković v. Belgium and others, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, ¶ 59.
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wherever in the world that act may have been committed or its conse-
quences felt, is thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the
purpose of Article 1 of the Convention.”41 Although Strasbourg jurispru-
dence has taken many turns since Banković, this particular holding is still
good law.
B. Attribution and State/IO Responsibility
Human rights abuses caused by private Non-state Actors (NSAs) can-
not be attributed to states or IOs unless they knowingly aided or abetted
the NSA,42 directed or controlled it,43 or coerced it to that end.44 None of
these conditions obtain in either of the hypotheticals, so the European
Union cannot be held responsible under either the Nicaragua45 or the
Tadić46 tests. The Commentary to the Maastricht Principles argues that the
principle in the Trail Smelter Arbitration47 and the Corfu Channel case,48
under which states have a general duty not to act in a way that causes
harm outside their territory, should be extended to create liability for ex-
traterritorial human rights violations.49 For this to make sense, however,
41. Id. ¶ 75.
42. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n to the G.A., Articles on the Responsibility of
States, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 16 (2001) reprinted in 2
Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 37 (2001), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [hereinafter ARS];
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n to the G.A.: Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No, 10, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, art. 14 (2011) re-
printed in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.778, annexed to G.A. Res. 66/100,
U.N. Doc A/RES/66/100 (27 Feb. 2012) [hereinafter ARIO].
43. See ARS, art. 17; ARIO, art. 15.
44. See ARS, art. 18; ARIO, art. 16.
45. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep 14, ¶¶ 108, 115-16 (June 27) (setting out two tests for state respon-
sibility: (1) where the actor is an alter ego of the state, or (2) where a specific operation was
carried out within the control and instruction of the state).
46. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment of Appeals Chamber, 39-62
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999) (setting out an “overall control”
test for state responsibility).
47. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941) (holding that
“under the principles of international law. . . no State has the right to use or permit the use of
its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties or persons therein. . .”).
48. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. at 22 (Apr. 9) (grounding
Albania’s obligation to inform British ships about presence of mines on “every State’s obliga-
tion not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States”).
49. See commentary to Principle 3, ¶ 9, in Olivier De Schutter et al., Commentary to
the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 1084, 1095-96 (2012) (finding that because “cus-
tomary international law prohibits a state from allowing its territory to be used to cause
damage on the territory of another state. . . [there is now] a duty for the state to respect and
protect human rights extraterritorially”). See also Loizidou v. Turkey, App No. 15318/89, 23
Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, ¶ 62 (1995) (finding that states may be responsible for violations of
international human rights treaty obligations where “acts of their authorities, whether per-
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there must be a wrong to complain of, and to say that that wrong consists
of a human rights violation, there must be a human rights relationship
between a right-holder and a duty-bearer.50 But that is precisely the ques-
tion at hand. The Maastricht Commentary is premature, resulting in the
human rights effects doctrine that was rejected in Banković. A better un-
derstanding of the Trail Smelter/Corfu Channel doctrine is that it pertains
to liability for tortious injury between states.51
C. General Jurisdiction under International Law
If compliance with international law is the heart of the matter, then
measures to protect human rights extraterritorially might be prohibited,
rather than just not required. The European Union would have no compe-
tence—much less an obligation—to protect the human rights of distant
strangers, if that would result in interference with the sovereignty of other
states. It is this consideration that makes geographical limits to the protec-
tions afforded by human rights treaties necessary, such that jurisdictional
limits are to be implied even if the relevant document does not specify
any, as was the case with the ICESCR in the Wall opinion.52
International law requires all state action to be based on at least one
of the classical grounds of jurisdiction: namely territoriality, nationality,
universality, or the protective principle. Outside of a massive humanita-
rian disaster causing hordes of refugees to pour into the European Union,
it is difficult to imagine how the universality, passive personality, or pro-
tective principles could be invoked to justify measures to address foreign
violations of socioeconomic rights like the right to food. (Precisely such a
disaster is arguably taking place at the time of writing.) This leaves territo-
riality and nationality. Regarding the former, there is the effects doctrine,
a variant of objective territorial jurisdiction. Its seminal expression was in
Alcoa, where Judge Learned Hand deemed it “settled law . . . that any
formed within or outside national boundaries. . . produce effects outside their own
territory”).
50. Bartels, supra note 13, at 1082.
51. The “rights of other States” mentioned in Corfu Channel, (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949
I.C.J. at 22, include rights to their nationals not being subjected to non-physical abuse and
humiliation. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Compensation, 2012
I.C.J. Rep. 324, ¶ 18 (June 19). These however, are the State’s own rights. The State has full
discretion as to whether to commence litigation on behalf of its national, which it may com-
promise or settle without consulting the national. If it wins reparations, it has no obligation to
hand any of it to the national. See ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF IN-
VESTMENT CLAIMS 17-18 (2009); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 45 (Feb. 5) (“Since the claim of the State is not identical with that
of the individual or corporate person whose cause is espoused, the State enjoys complete
freedom of action.”).
52. Cf. Violeta Moreno-Lax & Cathryn Costello, The Extraterritorial Application of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness
Model, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS–A COMMENTARY 1657, 1658 (Steve
Peers et al. eds., 2014) (arguing that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights does not have
any “threshold jurisdictional criterion,” partly because it lacks an express jurisdictional
clause).
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State may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance,
for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the State reprehends . . . .”53 This offers no help to distant strangers,
because the reprehended consequences are felt outside the EU’s borders.
As for nationality, §403(1) of the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law provides that “a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state
when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable” and two of the
eight factors to be taken into account are “the extent to which another
state may have an interest in regulating the activity”54 and “the likelihood
of conflict with regulation by another state.”55 Also relevant is the princi-
ple of nonintervention enshrined in the U.N. Charter56 and in the U.N.
General Assembly declarations on Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Internal Affairs of States57 and Friendly Relations.58 In Nicaragua, the
ICJ invoked these instruments to hold that the principle of noninterven-
tion “forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indi-
rectly in the internal or external affairs of other States,” explaining that a
“prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in
which each State is permitted . . . to decide freely . . . Intervention is wrong-
ful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must
remain free ones.”59 The European Union’s condemnation of Ruritanian
policy might influence Ruritania’s scope of action, but it does not take
53. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir., 1945). The
Alcoa doctrine has since been severely restricted by U.S. courts. See Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act (FTAIA) of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §6a (stating territorial jurisdiction is estab-
lished only where extraterritorial conduct has “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect” on trade or commerce in the U.S.); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
796 (1993) (limiting extraterritorial antitrust control to conduct that “was meant to produce
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States”) (emphasis added); F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (stating customers in the
United States cannot claim under the Sherman Act where affected by extraterritorial an-
ticompetitive conduct giving rise to foreign effects completely independent of effects within
the United States); Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (restricting the
application of U.S. securities law to securities traded on U.S. exchanges, and expanding the
presumption against extraterritorial legislative intent); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1673-74 (2013) (finding the presumption against extraterritorial legislation
precludes claims under Alien Tort Statute lacking sufficient connections with the United
States).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2)(g) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
55. Id. § 403(2)(h).
56. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
57. G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty (Dec.
21, 1965).
58. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).
59. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) (emphasis added).
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away Ruritania’s ability to make choices.60 What would, though, is if the
Commission were to effectively “sign it up” to the ICESCR by regulating
the merger for the benefit of Ruritanians.
D. Standing
Bartels includes a final, seemingly devastating point that severely cur-
tails the meaningfulness of even the few limited obligations under the
compliance reading. Article 263 of the TFEU provides that individual
standing to bring judicial review arises only against EU acts (1) addressed
to the applicant or of direct and individual concern to them, and (2) against
regulatory acts of direct concern to the applicant and not entailing imple-
menting measures. Numerous Advocates General have opined that many
socioeconomic rights, and some civil and political rights, depend upon fur-
ther specific implementation by states, and are therefore insufficiently un-
conditional and precise for direct effect.61 Article 263 of the TFEU also
limits judicial review to legislative acts or acts “intended to produce legal
effects vis-à-vis third parties.” Factual effects are not enough. In Commune
de Champagne, the General Court invoked the principle of sovereign
equality as found in Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter and the then Article
299 of the TEC (now Article 355 of the TFEU), limiting the application of
the Treaty on European Communities to the territory of the European
Community, to find that “an act of an institution adopted pursuant to the
Treaty, as a unilateral act of the Community, cannot create rights and obli-
gations outside the territory thus defined.”62 This means distant strangers
can never meet the standing requirements to review an EU unilateral act
on the basis of violations of their human rights extraterritorially, but will
instead have to repose their hopes in EU institutions or member states
who, as “privileged applicants,” are not fettered by normal standing re-
quirements.63 Such privileged applicants, however, are unlikely to under-
take litigation on behalf of distant strangers.64
60. Id. ¶¶ 244-45.
61. See, e.g., opinions of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-282/10, Dominguez v.
Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la region Centre, ¶105, 2014
ECLI:EU:C:2011:559; and Joined Cases C-350/06, Gerhard Schultz-Hoff v. Deutsche
Rentenversicherung Bund, & C-520/06, Stringer and others v. H.M. Revenue and Customs,
2009 E.C.R. I-179, ¶¶ 37, 50 (stating the signatory EU member states had broad discretion
with regard to the implementation of workers’ rights created by treaty, thereby precluding
direct effect); Case 236/87, Bergemann v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1988 E.C.R. 5132, ¶ 30
(Opinion of Advocate General Lenz) (finding Article 10 of the ICESCR “not sufficiently
precise for it to be possible to deduce from them an obligation on the public authorities to
take specific and concrete measures”).
62. Case T-212/02, Commune de Champagne v. Council, 2007 E.C.R. II-2023, ¶¶ 89-90
(denying standing for individual Swiss applicants to challenge EU international agreement on
basis of effects caused in Switzerland). See also Joined Cases T-108/07 & T-354/08, Spira v.
Comm’n., 2013 ECLI:EU:T:2013:367, ¶ 123 (finding Commission requests for information do
not create legal rights and duties outside EU).
63. See Bartels, supra note 13, at 1088 n.89.
64. Id. at 1089.
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It is submitted that the recent decision of the General Court in Front
Polisario v. Council65 does not alter the state of the law in this regard. In
that case, the General Court annulled a Council decision adopting an As-
sociation Agreement between the European Union and Morocco, on the
grounds that the Commission had failed to take into account the possibil-
ity that Morocco, as the occupying power in the Western Sahara, might
exploit the natural resources there for its own benefit, rather than that of
that of the inhabitants of the Western Sahara.66 The Court reasoned that
the Front Polisario, the national liberation movement in the Western Sa-
hara, possessed personality under EU law,67 and that its standing to chal-
lenge the association agreement arose from the fact that the association
agreement purported to bind it despite being a non-party.68 The Court
only obliquely addressed the implications of the treaty for the rights of
individual Sahrawis, and explicitly rejected the argument that the provi-
sions prohibited the European Union from entering into an association
agreement with Morocco, on grounds of human rights violations commit-
ted in the region by the latter.69 An individual Sahrawi would likely not
have had standing to challenge the association agreement.
In fact, the lack of standing for judicial review might not be such an
insurmountable barrier.70 The European Union’s restrictive standing rules
foreclose judicial review to most domestic plaintiffs as well, such that most
EU litigation is brought by way of the preliminary reference from national
courts rather than by direct action. Distant strangers might challenge EU
measures in this way, particularly if they must first be implemented by the
Member States. Nevertheless, Bartels’ point is valid. The Commune de
Champagne rule would foreclose judicial review in either of our hypotheti-
cal scenarios.
III. AN UNUSUAL CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
While much of the compliance reading is correct, this Article’s dis-
agreements lie primarily with the “international law” limb of Bartels’ ar-
gument. If one focuses on what was done rather than said in ATAA, it
becomes evident that the concept of “international law” to be complied
with is a singularly peculiar one, allowing for geographically unbounded
prescriptive jurisdiction. The paper demonstrates this doctrinally, by show-
ing that the theory of jurisdiction expressed in ATAA is similar to the so-
called “Lotus principle,” and analytically, by showing that ATAA relied on
65. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council, 2015 ECLI:EU:T:2015:953.
66. Id. ¶¶ 225-47.
67. Id. ¶¶ 52-54, 60.
68. Id. ¶¶ 94-111 (citing Case C-386/08, Firma Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Hamburg-Hafen, 2010 E.C.R. I-1289, ¶ 44).
69. Id. ¶¶ 143-48, 159-67.
70. Brian Libgober, Can the EU be a Constitutional System Without Universal Access
to Judicial Review, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 353, 355 (2015) (arguing that rules of standing for EU
judicial review are not particularly onerous compared to counterparts in individual Member
States, particularly in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty changes).
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a command rather than an inducement or threat. Thus, at least some EU
measures create not just effects, but legal effects, overseas.
In ATAA, the CJEU upheld the legality of the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme Directive,71 which required all aircraft entering or leaving airports
in the EU to offset their carbon emissions, even those made over foreign
airspace or the high seas. The Court began by asserting a number of com-
monplaces, namely: the priority of international agreements over EU sec-
ondary legislation, that the European Union was bound by norms of
customary international law (such as the freedom of the high seas and of
airspace belonging to the jurisdiction of the territorial state underneath),
and the general obligation of the EU to exercise its competences in light of
the international legal requirements.72 However, the Court proceeded to
find the imposition of emissions fees over such airplanes in full accordance
with treaty and customary international law.
The CJEU did not rely upon the nationality or protective principles,
nor could it have: the whole point was to subject foreign airplane opera-
tors to the same burdens as European operators, and no security interests
were involved. Territoriality was the sole reed that could have justified the
Emissions Trading Directive, and the Court invoked it in a singular fash-
ion. Jurisdiction was not premised upon the effects doctrine, as Advocate
General Kokott urged in her opinion.73 The effects doctrine is problematic
in environmental law, because environmental effects are often neither ter-
ritorially specific nor substantial enough to meet de minimis thresholds.
Indeed, if effects upon the local environment alone could justify prescrip-
tive jurisdiction, there would be no need for the planes to land in EU
territory. The Commission could calculate each airline operator’s global
emissions and bill it accordingly.74 In any case, ATAA was not so much
about avoiding undesired effects as about advancing a policy goal: the Eu-
ropean Union’s “environmental protection objectives which it has set for
itself, in particular where those objectives follow on from an international
agreement to which the European Union is a signatory . . . .”75 While the
judgment mentions that the airplanes’ extraterritorial conduct “con-
tribut[ed] to the pollution of the air, sea or land territory of the Member
States,”76 this appears almost as an afterthought; the only necessary
71. Air Trans. Ass’n of America, 2011 E.C.R., ¶¶ 156-57. See also Council Directive
2008/101, 2008 O.J. (L 8) 3 (EC) (amending Council Directive 2003/87, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3
(EC)).
72. Case C-366/10, Air Trans. Ass’n of America, 2011 E.C.R., ¶¶ 50, 101, 123.
73. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of
America, 2011 E.C.R., ¶ 154.
74. Geert De Baere & Cedric Ryngaert, The ECJ’s Judgment in Air Transport Associ-
ation of America and the International Legal Context of the EU’s Climate Policy, 18 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 389, 401 (2013). See Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the Applica-
tion of the EU’s Emission Trading System to Aviation, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 429, 459 (2012).
75. Case C-366/10, Air Trans. Ass’n of America, 2011 E.C.R., ¶ 128. The international
agreements in question are the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.
76. Id. ¶ 129.
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grounds for establishing jurisdiction over the aircraft was presence in EU
territory. Instead, the Court held that the imposition of charges upon for-
eign airplanes for emissions made over the high seas or over third states
offended neither the customary rules of territorial jurisdiction nor the sov-
ereignty of third states over their airspace, because the charges were col-
lected after the airplanes entered EU territory,77 at which point they
became subject to the “unlimited” jurisdiction of the EU and the relevant
member state.78 In any event, the European Union was held competent to
specify the terms upon which commercial trade is carried on within EU
territory, which could include a high level of protection for the
environment.79
The reasoning in ATAA is reminiscent of a strategy described in F.A.
Mann’s classic exposition of the concept of jurisdiction, whereby a regulat-
ing state maintains it is not in any way regulating matters extraterritorially
but merely pronouncing upon the effect of foreign conduct domestically.
Considering a hypothetical statute prohibiting marriages between persons
below sixteen years of age intended to apply irrespective of nationality,
domicile, or residence, Mann declared that “[s]uch legislation doubtless
constitute[d] an excess of jurisdiction.”80 In an earlier piece, Bartels devel-
oped on Mann’s insight to advocate the following test for extraterritorial-
ity: “The first step is to define legislation as ‘extraterritorial’ according to
the legal connection between the legislation and the extraterritorial sub-
ject-matter; the second is to ask whether this amounts to a denial of oppor-
tunities normally open to the person against whom enforcement is
directed.”81 Note that for Bartels, a “legal connection” is not the same
thing as a legal effect: in his view, “a measure defined by something lo-
cated or occurring abroad should be considered just as extraterritorial as a
measure specifically mandating or forbidding conduct abroad.”82 It suf-
fices for the measure to be “directed” at, or “made applicable to conduct
abroad in a relevant sense.” Thus, tariffs and subsidies are territorial,
while Process and Production Methods (PPM) measures—that is, mea-
sures which restrict entry to foreign goods on the basis of the manner in
which they were produced abroad—are extraterritorial.83 The Emissions
Trading Directive was directed at foreign airplane operators, because it
77. Id. ¶¶ 124-26.
78. See id. ¶¶ 124-25. At ¶ 124, the CJEU speaks of both the EU and the relevant
Member State having unlimited jurisdiction over the aircraft, while ¶ 125 speaks only of the
EU.
79. Id. ¶ 128 (citing TFEU art. 191(2)).
80. F.A. MANN, THE DOCTRINE OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1964).
81. Lorand Bartels, Article XX of the GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Juris-
diction: The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, 36 J. WORLD
TRADE 353, 381 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). See generally id. at 381-86.
82. Id. at 381 (citing Lepre v. Lepre [1963] 2 WLR 735 (Eng.)) (disregarding for excess
of jurisdiction a Maltese decree voiding all marriages by Roman Catholic Maltese citizens not
conducted according to Catholic rites); discussed by MANN, supra note 80, at 12.
83. Id. at 381-82.
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turned on conduct abroad, and, had it come into effect, would have re-
sulted in a reduction of the opportunities those operators had enjoyed
before. As such, the supposed authority for interpreting Article 3(5) of the
TEU as mandating compliance with international law is itself difficult to
reconcile84 with Bartels’ own extremely respectable interpretation of it.85
A. Lotus and the Spatial Scope of EU Law
In their commentary upon the ATAA decision, Geert De Baere and
Cedric Ryngaert consider the reference to Poulsen and Diva Navigation
(involving the application on the high seas of Regulation 3094/86,86
prohibiting the fishing of salmon and sea trout), rather than the language
about “unlimited” jurisdiction over airplanes in EU territory, as revealing
the Court’s real rationale behind the justification for the extraterritorial
emissions charges. In Poulsen, the ECJ upheld the application of that envi-
ronmental protection measure over the high seas through a similarly ex-
pansive claim of prescriptive jurisdiction.87 Accordingly, De Baere and
Ryngaert suggest that the CJEU in ATAA was proposing a “novel ground
of jurisdiction [aiming] at the protection of global public goods that are
insufficiently protected by international solutions,” whereby
individual States or regional groupings such as the EU should be
allowed to ‘go it alone’, provided that the global public goods
which they protect are laid down in international instruments with
a global reach (whether or not they are binding, such as the Kyoto
Protocol), and provided that a territorial link with the regulator
can be discerned.88
Evidently, there is much more taking place than compliance with existing
international law. However, De Baere and Ryngaert perhaps track the
facts of ATAA too closely. By the phrase “in particular,” the Court implies
84. See Eyal Benvenisti, Legislating for Humanity: May States Compel Foreigners to
Promote Global Welfare? (GlobalTrust Working Paper Series No. 02/2013), http://globaltrust
.tau.ac.il/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Legislating_for_Humanity_WPS-2-13-ISSN.pdf (ob-
serving that the CJEU’s notion of sovereignty “which does not recognize any limits to the
prescriptive jurisdiction of the European states is incompatible with basic principles of inter-
national law on state jurisdiction”).
85. For a view similar to Bartels’, see Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 264-
65 (2010) (looking to the “focus” or the “solicitude” of a particular statute in assessing
whether it had an extraterritorial purpose).
86. Council Regulation 3094/86, 1986 O.J. (L 288) 1.
87. Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation, 1992 E.C.R.
I-06019, ¶¶ 28-29, 34.
88. De Baere & Ryngaert, supra note 74, at 401. See also Benvenisti, supra note 84, at
12-13 (regarding ATAA as an example of an emerging trend in international law recognizing
unilateral jurisdiction to provide global public goods); Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent:
International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 19-20 (2014)
(viewing the EU’s inclusion of international flights in the Emissions Trading Directive as
involving “a redefinition of the jurisdictional limits on extraterritorial action, or at least a
‘territorial extension’ in response to transboundary challenges”) (citations omitted).
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that the goods sought to be protected need not necessarily be desirable
according to established international consensus. The European Union has
enforced purportedly universal rules “before the relevant international
standards have entered into force, when the international standards are in
a form that is not binding, and where they have been ratified by only a
small number of states.”89
Nor is the ATAA theory of jurisdiction restricted to furthering benign
purposes, such as environmental protection or human rights. Scott claims
that ATAA expresses a new theory of territorial jurisdiction termed “terri-
torial extension,” which she distinguishes from impermissible extraterrito-
riality. In her view, a measure is extraterritorial if it “imposes obligations
on persons who do not enjoy a relevant territorial connection with the
regulating state,” while territorial extension obtains when “application de-
pends upon the existence of a relevant territorial connection, but where
the relevant regulatory determination will be shaped as a matter of law, by
conduct or circumstances abroad.”90 She argues that the European Union
only rarely asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction, but that it often resorts to
territorial extension, finding examples in the regulatory domains of cli-
mate change, environment, maritime transport, air transport, financial ser-
vices, and competition.91
While De Baere, Ryngaert, and Scott all consider ATAA as a new
development in international law, it is actually reminiscent of the “Lotus
principle” enunciated in certain dicta by the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ) in Lotus, the oldest and perhaps only full exposition
of the concept of jurisdiction by an international court.92 As is well known,
the PCIJ held in Lotus that Turkey could exercise criminal jurisdiction
over a French national in connection with a collision between a French
steamship and a Turkish vessel in the high seas that resulted in the deaths
of eight Turkish nationals. The official grounds of the PCIJ decision relied
upon the technical reason that a vessel, as was the law at the time, consti-
tuted part of the territory of its flag state.93 However, in an obiter passage,
89. Joanne Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 87, 112 (2014) (citing Commission Regulation 391/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 131) 11 [here-
inafter Class Societies Regulation], regulating ship inspection and survey organizations en-
gaged in ensuring the safety of maritime transport, by providing certificates attesting to a
particular vessel’s seaworthiness and general compliance with relevant international mari-
time safety and marine pollution conventions). Such bodies can operate in the European
Union only if recognized by the European Union and authorized by a member state. The
European Union’s grant of recognition is conditional upon compliance worldwide with EU
standards on ship safety and environmental protection, even on non-EU flagged ships
outside of EU territory. These standards and their scope of application exceed those set out
in international instruments currently being negotiated within the framework of the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization. See id. at 101-02, 111-13.
90. Id. at 89-90. Scott’s phrase “imposes obligations” is problematic. As will be demon-
strated in Section III(B), certain examples she characterizes as extraterritorial never actually
impose “obligations” per se.
91. Id. at 95-96.
92. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sep. 27).
93. Id. at 25. The facts are recited at 10-12.
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the PCIJ laid out for the first time the distinction between enforcement
and prescriptive jurisdiction, observing that, whereas sovereign states were
prohibited from exercising their enforcement jurisdiction upon the terri-
tory of any other state absent an affirmative rule of international law, the
opposite applied for prescriptive jurisdiction: sovereign states are free to
assert prescriptive jurisdiction outside their territory in the absence of a
prohibitive rule. The Court’s exact words were:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international
law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule
to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the
territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly ter-
ritorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory ex-
cept by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international
custom or from a convention. It does not, however, follow that
international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in
its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which
have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some per-
missive rule of international law.94
As is well known, however, the Lotus principle is very widely dispar-
aged. Mann deemed it “a most unfortunate and retrograde theory . . .
[which] cannot claim to be good law,”95 while Judge Fitzmaurice in Barce-
lona Traction read Lotus restrictively as merely stating a presumption in
favor of the validity of claims of prescriptive jurisdiction.96 Ryngaert
points to how jurisdictional principles in comparative criminal law have
evolved to recognize a prohibition on extending a state’s prescriptive juris-
diction beyond its physical borders, in a “scathing indictment” of “the Lo-
tus-like jurisdictional merry-go-round with States doing whatever they
like . . . .”97 Instead, “[u]nder the customary international law of jurisdic-
tion, as historically developed, extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction is
arguably prohibited in the absence of a permissive rule.”98
94. Id. at 18-19.
95. MANN, supra note 80, at 35. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 77 (1994); A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 263
(1981).
96. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3,
105 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion by Fitzmaurice, J.) (observing that while “[i]t is true that,
under present conditions, international law does not impose hard and fast rules on States
delimiting spheres of national jurisdiction in such matters . . . It does however (a) postulate
the existence of limits . . .”). See also Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 37, ¶ 4 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion by Guillaume, J.) (observing that
“classic international law does not exclude a State’s power in some cases to exercise its judi-
cial jurisdiction over offences committed abroad. But as the Permanent Court stated, once
again in the ‘Lotus’ case, the exercise of that jurisdiction is not without its limits”) (citations
omitted).
97. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2d ed., 2015).
98. De Baere & Ryngaert, supra note 74, at 35.
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Given the intensely controversial nature of Lotus-style assertions of
prescriptive authority, one cannot expect it to be admitted openly.99 The
CJEU is assisted in this regard by the fact that its judgments are written by
committee in an oracular fashion, masking each judge’s individual views.
However, some clues to what transpires in at least some of the judges’
minds might be discerned from the opinions of the Advocates General,
whose goal is to convince a majority of the bench. In this light, consider
the reliance upon Lotus by Advocate General Jääskinen in his opinion in
United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, where the United Kingdom
sought to annul the cap on bankers’ bonuses imposed by Directive (EU)
2013/36. In its application, the United Kingdom urged the “compliance”
reading of Article 3(5) of the TEU, arguing that to “the extent that Article
94(1)(g) [of the Directive] is required to be applied to employees of insti-
tutions outside the EEA, it infringes Article 3(5) TEU and the principle of
territoriality found in customary international law.”100 Advocate General
Jääskinen opined that the United Kingdom “would simply be wrong if it
sought to claim that only territorial jurisdiction to legislate is permitted
under international law,”101 because the Lotus decision could be “relied
on in the determination of a State’s or other comparable subject’s jurisdic-
tion to prescribe, in other words to subject facts and conduct to the scope
of application of its legislation, in contradistinction with the jurisdiction to
enforce its power in any form in the territory of another State.”102 Advo-
cate General Jääskinen then recommended the dismissal of the United
Kingdom’s argument, saying that “there can be no violation of Article 3(5)
TEU because no such principle of international law against extraterritori-
ality . . . exists.”103
Thus, the compliance reading might indeed be correct in understand-
ing the provisions as primarily mandating compliance with international
law. The catch, however, is that the kind of international law to be com-
plied with entails particularly expansive ideas about prescriptive
jurisdiction.104
99. See Benvenisti, supra note 84, at 12 (observing that the aims of ATAA can “be
read only between the lines and with great effort”).
100. Case C-507/13, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, Application of United
Kingdom, 359 O.J. C 4, 6th plea (Sept. 20, 2013). The U.K. withdrew its application before
the CJEU rendered judgment.
101. Case C-507/13, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:2394, ¶ 38
(Nov. 20, 2014) (opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen).
102. Id. ¶ 37 (citing Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 & 125/85 to 129/
85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v. Comm’n (Wood Pulp I), 1988 E.C.R. 5193, ¶¶ 27-30
(May 25, 1988) (opinion of Advocate General Darmon)).
103. Id. ¶ 41.
104. In fact, this vision of international law and prescriptive jurisdiction might strike
even its proponents as preposterous. Both Advocates General Darmon and Jääskinen betray
some half-heartedness by even asking whether Lotus was ‘still sailing,’ and the CJEU in
ATAA cited Lotus only in support of a technical point about the law of the sea. Case 366/10,
Air Trans. Ass’n of America, 2011 E.C.R., ¶ 104.
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B. Power, Authority, and the Nature of ‘Territorial Extension’
There is an ambiguity in the PCIJ’s language about “exercising juris-
diction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts
which have taken place abroad.”105 What does it mean for an exercise of
jurisdiction to “relate to acts abroad”? The relation between the measure
and the overseas conduct may be one of influence, incentivization, or ma-
nipulation—a relation of power. Alternatively, the measure may purport
to govern conduct abroad, by directly telling persons there what to do: a
relation of authority. This subsection demonstrates analytically that the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction involved in territorial extension sometimes entails not
just an exercise of power, but a claim of authority.
While a complete treatment of this most ancient and intractable con-
troversy is beyond the scope of this paper, something of the distinction
drawn here between power and authority is captured in H.L.A. Hart’s dis-
tinction between being ordered to hand over one’s money by a gunman
and being commanded to do so by an official.106 The results of non-coop-
eration may be similar or identical in both cases, but we tend to say you
are “obliged” by the gunman’s order but “obligated” by the official’s com-
mand. Only the latter utterance implies a binding of your will.
One might be led from this to think that power and authority were
entirely separate things. Such a view is most often ascribed to Hannah
Arendt, who differentiated authority from “coercion by force” and also
from “persuasion through arguments,” on the grounds that, “where force
is used, authority itself has failed . . . [w]here arguments are used, author-
ity is left in abeyance.”107 On this view, “authority” comes from a semi-
mystical realm outside of ordinary politics, such as a religious cult, tradi-
tion, or a mixture of both. The same idea is echoed by Hart, whose ac-
count springs from secondary rules of recognition that reflect an “attitude
of shared acceptance”108 by the members of the legal community of the
criteria by which they can recognize the primary rules of obligation bind-
ing upon them. Hartian secondary rules do not themselves deal with
coercion.
Contrary to Arendt and Hart, this paper assumes that authority is not
separate from power, but a very specific type of it. It seems strange to say
that an act of punishment by a parent of a child or of a criminal by the
State in any way detracts from or diminishes the parent’s or state’s author-
ity.109 Instead, it reinforces and problematizes it. Indeed, it is not the phe-
105. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 27).
106. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, ch. 2 (2d ed., 1994). For a similar ap-
proach to illustrating the difference between power and authority, see EVAN FOX-DECENT,
SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 3 (2011).
107. HANNAH ARENDT, What is Authority?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT
EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 91, 92-93 (1961).
108. HART, supra note 106, at 102.
109. Arendt acknowledges that her concept of authority no longer exists, having disap-
peared with the advent of modernity, which she identifies with Machiavelli. ARENDT, supra
note 107, at 136-39.
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nomenon of authority, but violence or coercion that is the fundamental
problem of all legal and political theory. Ronald Dworkin’s objection to
positivist accounts of law built upon the social acceptance of standards
without reference to their moral implications, arises from the fact that
those standards serve to channel and direct violence.110 Law’s intimate
connection with violence requires such social standards to be morally de-
fensible, so legal philosophy is therefore necessarily a department of moral
inquiry. However, the connection between morality and law is not direct.
As Arthur Ripstein observes, the lawyer does not begin by asking the phi-
losopher’s question of “how people ought to treat each other,” but by ask-
ing “the distinctly political question of how they may legitimately be
forced to treat each other.”111 Therefore, political authority is necessarily
a kind of power: “a kind of capability to do something.”112 Crucially how-
ever, it also entails a normative element: it is a “normative power to
change another’s normative relations.”113 Authority has two components:
prescription and enforcement. It is the claim of a dual entitlement to “tell
you what to do, and to force you to do as you are told.”114
Of course, it may often be difficult to determine whether particular
instances are of power or authority: consider the recommendations of the
informal Basel Committee on banking regulation, or a parking ticket is-
sued by a privatized traffic police force. However, the twin criteria of pre-
scription and enforcement serve as useful markers. Political authority
differs both from “soft power” wielded by private corporations and stan-
dard-setting organizations, and from non-practical forms of authority
wielded by experts. Although there may be significant overlap in prac-
110. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 93 (1986)
Our discussions about law by and large assume, I suggest, that the most abstract
and fundamental point of legal practice is to guide and constrain the power of
government in the following way. Law insists that force not be used or withheld,
no matter how useful that would be to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or
noble these ends, except as licensed or required by individual rights and responsi-
bilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is justified.
111. Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 2, 6 (2004).
112. NICOLE ROUGHAN, AUTHORITIES: CONFLICTS, COOPERATION, AND TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL THEORY 19 (2013).
113. Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 398 (Jules Coleman et al. eds., 2002). See also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF LAW 17-18 (1979) (defining normative power as the ability to change “protected
reasons,” comprising “both a reason for an action and an [exclusionary] reason for disregard-
ing reasons against it.” The homely example Raz uses for illustrating this point is of a father
overruling a mother’s instruction to their son to wear a certain coat when going out at night.
The fact the father is able to do so, means he has authority in the family).
114. Ripstein, supra note 111, at 2. Of course, the making of commands is only one
aspect of governing—authorities also create/modify legal rights and duties, i.e. by making
rules governing the drafting of contracts, wills, etc. Authority therefore includes not just the
entitlement to tell you what to do, but also how to go about in doing the things you want to
do. For the sake of brevity, the phrase ‘tell you what to do’ in the rest of this work should be
understood to include the entitlement to create legal capacities.
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tice—experts may be appointed to high office, or private standards given
force of law by legislation—the pronouncements, standards, and recom-
mendations of experts and informal bodies cannot in and of themselves
amount to practical authority, because no one is obligated thereby.115 An
exercise of ordinary power, be it influence, manipulation, or outright vio-
lence, does not include a claim that the subject has a moral duty to obey.
An assertion of political authority, however, does.116 Compliance with
standards set by informal or private organizations can only be for pruden-
tial reasons; one may lose access to certain markets if one declines to com-
ply. Thus, one may be “obliged,” but never “obligated,” to follow those
standards. As for epistemic authority, there may be good reason to follow
expert advice. However, the expected response to expertise or “epistemic
authority” is deference, implying choice, and therefore an equality of status
between the giver and the recipient. As Nicole Roughan observes, “my
doctor knows far more about medicine than I do, but decisions about my
treatment are ultimately mine to make, not hers.”117 The imperatives of
epistemic authority are of belief: an expert’s credentials provide reasons to
believe her advice is wise. In contrast, subjects of practical authorities,
such as children vis-à-vis their parents, are expected not to defer, but to
obey.118
With this in mind, it may be taken as given that the European Union
as the world’s largest trading bloc wields considerable power in the wider
world. Anu Bradford describes a “Brussels Effect,” whereby EU regula-
tory regimes set global standards in a way resulting in a “race to the top”
rather than to the bottom.119 There are extensive political science litera-
115. ROUGHAN, supra note 112, at 20.
116. Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, in AUTHORITY 115, 116 (Joseph Raz ed.,
1990) (“The exercise of coercive or any other form of power is no exercise of authority unless
it includes an appeal to compliance by the person(s) subject to the authority. That is why
authority is typically exercised by giving instructions of one kind or another. But appeal to
compliance makes sense precisely because it is an invocation of the duty to obey.”); id. at 118
(“Having de facto authority is not just having an ability to influence people. It is coupled with
a claim that those people are bound to obey.”).
117. ROUGHAN, supra note 112, at 20.
118. Id. at 109
Authority relationships exist where one institution or person is subject to the au-
thority of another, while relations of deference can arise between institutions and
persons who are not in authority relations, not indeed in any sort of hierarchical
relationship. Deference entails that an agent who defers has the capacity and the
normative power to decide for herself; she simply chooses not to. This seems to be
a necessary characteristic of deference to distinguish it from obedience: if you have
legitimate authority over me, my obligation is to obey, not to defer.
119. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4, 8 (2012). See also
Graham Greenleaf, The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside Europe: Im-
plications for Globalisation of Convention 108, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 68, 76 (2012) (sug-
gesting “a strong inference that European privacy standards have been, either directly or
indirectly, influential [as an impetus for adopting internet data privacy laws] in all of these
[twenty-nine] Latin American, Asian, African, and Australasian countries”).
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tures on “Normative Power Europe”120 and “Market power Europe,”121
both of which agree the European Union wields tremendous power in the
world, even as they disagree about the kinds of power and the motivations
behind it. The task at hand, however, is to demonstrate whether something
more is involved. Contrast the European Union’s method of asserting ju-
risdiction with the WTO Appellate Body’s jurisprudence on PPMs, upheld
in principle by the Appellate Body even if the actual measures so far have
been struck down for lack of consultation with other WTO Members.122
As discussed above, PPMs raise the issue of extraterritoriality because by
focusing on the manufacturing process, they purportedly regulate produc-
tion in the exporting state rather than the effects of products in the im-
porting state.123 Scott asserts that the technique of “territorial extension”
is supported by the PPM jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body,
thereby suggesting that it is either an accepted or emerging theory of terri-
torial jurisdiction.124
This Article submits that there is a subtle but crucial difference be-
tween PPMs and territorial extension. The typical PPM aims to achieve its
objective by placing conditions upon the entry of the product into the ju-
risdiction, such as by banning it, taxing it, or excluding it from public pro-
curement schemes.125 It never actually demands any conduct outside the
regulating state: all it does is regulate conduct within the borders in a man-
ner that incentivizes, induces, or manipulates individuals into doing some-
thing overseas. It affects to say, “By all means carry on as you please, if
you think yourself tough enough to survive being denied access to our
markets.” As an importer, such measures may interfere—perhaps se-
verely—with your individual purposes, but they do not affect your purpos-
iveness, that is, your ability to set your own ends. The same logic inspires
the effects doctrine. As a producer, you can do whatever you want outside
120. Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? 40 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 235 (2002).
121. Chad Damro, Market power Europe, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 682 (2012).
122. Much of this jurisprudence involved regulatory measures aimed at advancing envi-
ronmental goals. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 121, 133, 159, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct.
12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report]; Panel Report, United States—
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted
May 20, 1996); Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Automobiles (not adopted), GATT
Doc. DS31/R (adopted Sept. 30, 1994); Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on the Im-
ports of Tuna (not adopted), GATT Doc. DS29/R (adopted May 20, 1994); Panel Report,
United States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. DS23/R - 39S/
206 (adopted Feb. 7, 1992); Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on the Imports of Tuna
(not adopted), GATT Doc. DS21/R (adopted Aug. 16, 1991).
123. See Bartels, supra note 81, at 381-86; Laurens Ankersmit et al., Diverging EU and
WTO perspectives on extraterritorial process regulation, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 14, 14 (2012).
124. Scott, supra note 89, at 115-16; see RYNGAERT, supra note 97, at 97-98.
125. Gareth Davies, International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitu-
tionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1203, 1208 (2012).
Note, it is entirely possible a PPM might be devised directly mandating conduct abroad, for
instance by imposing a simple fine.
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the borders, even if it is incredibly destructive to humanity as a whole-you
are perfectly entitled to your pound of flesh. The only objection is to your
causing direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects within the
borders. You are thus “obliged,” rather than “obligated,” to amend your
conduct overseas. If you can find a way of doing what you are currently
doing overseas, but in a manner that does not cause these effects locally,
you are again free to carry on. Thus, neither PPMs nor the effects doctrine
actually ever bind you extraterritorially; they merely “change the world in
which you act,” rendering your means unsuitable for the purposes you
originally intended.126 Though the regulating state wields power over the
producer extraterritorially, it does so by exercising its authority—its enti-
tlement to create legal rights and duties—only within its borders, as it is
unquestionably entitled to do in the absence of contrary agreement.
Territorial extension, at least as exemplified by ATAA, is different.
The emissions trading scheme did not simply incentivize, manipulate, or
induce the foreign airplanes to offset their overseas carbon emissions; it
demanded it. Certainly, the Emissions Trading Directive was not enforced
while the airplanes were overflying foreign territories or the high seas, and
airplane operators could have avoided its application by choosing not to
enter the European Union. However, that is where the similarities end.
The directive was not an exclusionary tool like a tariff. No Member State
would have used its discretion in implementing the Directive to scramble
fighter jets to prevent a noncompliant airplane from entering its airspace,
or to instruct its airport control towers to deny them landing permission.
Instead, such planes would have been allowed to land and take off as per
normal. The competent Member State authorities would simply have sent
a bill to the operator’s head office, with a threat of execution upon assets
in the event of non-payment. Moreover, the scheme applied to foreign
airplanes leaving the European Union as well. In fact, this issue was specif-
ically litigated in ATAA: the Court dismissed the argument that the
scheme was a tax, duty, fee or charge imposed on the fuel load in violation
of the Open Skies Agreement,127 holding that by its very nature the emis-
sions trading scheme was a “market-based measure” which, if used pru-
dently, might even turn a profit for the airline operators.128 In short,
territorial extension, at least as applied in ATAA, implies a command to
do something abroad, enforceable upon establishing presence in the Euro-
pean Union, obligating individuals, foreign and domestic, regardless of
borders. Whereas the rationale behind “typical” PPMs is one of influenc-
ing overseas conduct by threatening exclusion from the market, territorial
extension treats overseas conduct as taking place within the domestic mar-
126. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 41 (2010). For a similar argument about trade restrictions, see Mattias Kumm, The
Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 IND. J.
LEG. STUD. 605, 623 (2013).
127. Case C-366/10, Air Trans. Ass’n of America, 2011 E.C.R., ¶ 21 (citing US-EU
Open Skies Agreement, art. 11, 2007 O.J. (L 134)).
128. Id. ¶¶ 142-45.
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ket, thereby including it within the scope of the regulatory competence.
The same logic animates Google Spain, where the foreign parent corpora-
tion was simply included in the scope of application of the EU Data Pro-
tection Directive, on the basis of its Spanish subsidiary.129 It provides
another line of case law, traceable to ICI v. Commission, where the CJEU
adopted the “single economic entity” test, whereby the presence of an un-
dertaking in the European Union sufficed to extend jurisdiction over its
affiliates and subsidiaries all over the world, such that conduct restricting
competition within the common market because of the activities of subsid-
iaries could be imputed to the parent companies.130 As an early and per-
ceptive piece in these pages observed:
In the domestic U.S. paradigm, the role of boundaries is one of
delimitation. The power of a court goes to the state’s boundaries,
not beyond them. . . By contrast, the role of state boundaries in
the international European paradigm is one of allocation: the lo-
cus of an event or a party defines the place that has jurisdiction in
a multilateral fashion.131
Certainly, both the typical PPM and territorial extension work on the prin-
ciple that “if you want to benefit from our market, you must do it on our
terms.”132 The question, however, is about the content of those terms. The
typical PPM demands conduct only within the territory, even if the objec-
tive is to influence behavior outside it. In contrast, under territorial exten-
sion, the terms can span the entire world to govern conduct outside of EU
territory directly.
The most striking examples of this attitude are found in the CJEU’s
extraterritorial competition decisions. Unlike the General Court,133 the
CJEU has never relied upon the effects doctrine in competition cases. The
leading case is Wood Pulp I, which involved an international cartel coordi-
nating the prices of wood pulp being sold into the European Union. The
Court rejected pleas by both the Commission and the Advocate General
for the adoption of the effects doctrine, holding instead that the “decisive
factor . . . is the place where the [anti-competitive agreement] is imple-
mented.”134 Now, if the European Union’s ability to create legal effects—
129. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protéc-
cion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶¶ 48-56.
130. Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Comm’n of European Commodities,
1972 E.C.R. 619, ¶¶ 132-35.
131. Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1058
(2005-06). Note, Michaels discusses jurisdiction to adjudicate private disputes, rather than
prescriptive jurisdiction.
132. Suzanne Kingston, Territoriality in EU (taxation) law: A sacred principle, or
dépassé? 17 UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Pa-
per No. 06, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2585994.
133. See Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Lonrho, 1999 E.C.R. II-753, ¶ 90.
134. Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 & 125/85 to 129/85, Ahlström
Osakeyhtiö and Others v. Comm’n (Wood Pulp I), 1988 E.C.R., ¶ 16. See generally id. ¶¶ 11-
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that is, to govern—really stopped at its borders, the appropriate response
in Wood Pulp I would have been to regulate the quarterly price announce-
ments occurring inside EU territory, not the cartel activity outside. In-
stead, we find that the activity of announcing prices is of no concern to the
regulator, merely the presence established in order to implement such ac-
tivity is important. Presence qua implementation is enough to govern be-
havior all over the world. The General Court’s subsequent jurisprudence
confirms this. In Gencor v. Lonrho, the General Court held that the re-
quirement of foreseeable immediate and substantial effect could be satis-
fied by the mere sale of product into the European Union, irrespective of
the location of the source of production.135 This was confirmed in Intel,
where the General Court firstly clarified that the Wood Pulp I “implemen-
tation” test and the Gencor “qualified effects doctrine” were alternative,
rather than cumulative, requirements, and reiterated that for the former
test it was not necessary for there to be direct sales into the European
Union.136 Again, the logic is of transitory presence in the European Union
giving rise to authority to prescribe norms governing conduct all over the
world.
Effectively, these considerations mean that the rule in Commune de
Champagne—that is, that the European Union cannot create legal effects
outside its territory—might be incorrect. In fact, Commune de Champagne
may even be contradicted on point by prior CJEU jurisprudence. In
Boukhalfa, the CJEU rejected a claim by Germany that EU fundamental
freedoms could not be claimed by a Belgian national employed as a mem-
ber of the local staff at the Belgian embassy in Algiers, under a contract
subject to Algerian law. The CJEU rejected Germany’s argument that the
then Article 227 of the TEC137 limited the application of the EU Treaties
to the territory of the Member States, holding instead that the “article
does not . . . preclude Community rules from having effects outside the
territory of the Community.”138 It is also telling that the General Court
18 (finding that although the sources of wood pulp were located outside the EU, the fact that
the undertakings concerned competed for custom within it meant they were engaging in com-
petition within the EU, such that the application of EU competition regulation to them was a
valid exercise of jurisdiction under the territoriality principle). The prohibition against an-
ticompetitive agreements requires such agreements to have as its object or effect the restric-
tion of competition within the Common Market. However, effects are a criterion for merger
regulation, not a basis for jurisdiction. See id. ¶ 2.
135. Case T-102/96, Gencor, 1999 E.C.R. II-753, ¶ 87. See also Case T-91/11, InnoLux
Corp. v. Comm’n, 2014 ECLI:EU:T:2014:92, ¶ 63.
136. Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, 2014 ECLI:EU:T:2014:547, ¶¶ 231-44.
137. This was the same provision interpreted by the General Court in Commune de
Champagne. ‘Article 227 EC’ is the numbering in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the
Treaty of Rome (1957), while ‘Article 299 EC’ is its numbering in the Treaty of Nice (2001).
138. Case C-214/94, Ingrid Boukhalfa v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 1996 E.C.R. I-2253, ¶
14. The effects concerned here are clearly legal effects. Id. ¶ 15 (“[T]he Court has consist-
ently held that provisions of Community law may apply to professional activities pursued
outside Community territory as long as the employment relationship retains a sufficiently
close link with the Community.”).
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cited neither Commune de Champagne nor Articles 25 of the TEU and
355 of the TFEU in its recent Polisario decision. Properly interpreted, that
provision, as well as its heirs in Articles 25 of the TEU and 355 of the
TFEU, does not place geographical limits upon EU law, but specifies the
High Contracting Parties bound by it.139
These considerations reveal a unique dimension to territorial exten-
sion. Whereas territorial states induce events in the external world
through influence or manipulation, territorial extension—at least some-
times140—involves direct authority. Thus, one must reject both Scott’s
claim that territorial extension measures are not extraterritorial because
there is some territorial connection with the regulating state, as well as
Bartels’ argument that a measure is extraterritorial if it is “directed” at, or
“made applicable to conduct abroad,” or even if it is intended to affect
persons or conduct overseas. Territorial extension does not just affect con-
duct abroad; it potentially governs it. Scott’s argument assumes that the
place of enforcement is the crucial factor in determining whether a mea-
sure is extraterritorial, when it is actually prescription that matters. It is
the act of prescription, not enforcement, that modifies your legal position;
by the time a norm is being enforced against you, your legal rights and
duties should ideally already have been determined. Enforcement is
merely the final act in the piece.
With respect to Bartels, there is in principle no difference between
tariffs, subsidies, or interest rate hikes on the one hand, and measures such
as PPMs or sanctions explicitly defined by conduct or events overseas on
the other: both simply affect people abroad. They cannot be distinguished
on the basis of their “focus” or “solicitude”—agricultural subsidies are
carefully calibrated by teams of economists and statisticians to erode the
comparative advantage of foreign farmers by precise amounts. Thus, the
real concern about PPMs is not that they regulate extraterritorial activ-
ity,141 but that they may upset an agreement between state parties to open
139. Moreno-Lax & Costello, supra note 52, at 1664.
140. Certain examples provided by Scott operate on the same ‘exclusionary’ logic of the
typical PPM. See, e.g., the Class Societies Regulation, supra note 89.
141. Ankersmit et al., supra note 123, at 24 (because PPMs merely “incentivize, but do
not mandate, certain behavior in other states, it is not clear to what extent they should be
considered truly ‘extraterritorial’”); JASON POTTS, THE LEGALITY OF PPMS UNDER THE
GATT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE TRADE POLICY 5-6 (2008),
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/ppms_gatt.pdf
[I]t is unclear how a PPM measure (or any other measure implemented through a
government’s legitimate authority) can be said to “infringe” upon the national sov-
ereignty of its trading partners. If the implementation of PPM-based policy re-
stricts access to a particular market, then it remains within the authority of the
foreign jurisdiction to decide whether or not it wants to access that market. Policies
that restrict market access are viable instruments under international law precisely
because they don’t infringe upon national sovereignty.
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up their domestic markets to each other except in certain specified
instances.142
The correct test for whether a measure engages in extraterritorial ju-
risdiction is to ask, “where are you when you are being told what to do?”
If the answer is “somewhere overseas,” then it constitutes extraterritorial
jurisdiction. This test takes seriously both the words “extraterritorial” and
“jurisdiction”—the latter means “speaking the law.”143 On this reading,
the Emissions Trading Directive, as well as a great deal of the European
Union’s competition and financial regulation, is emphatically extraterrito-
rial. The European Union regularly claims authority all over the world,
and has always done so.
IV. AUTHORITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Human rights both constrain and justify political authority. Where the
European Union claims geographically unbounded authority to prescribe
laws governing conduct, it has perfect and enforceable human rights obli-
gations towards distant strangers governed thereby, including positive ob-
ligations to protect and fulfill. It is also important for the argument of this
paper that human rights obligations arise only from claims of authority,
and never from exercises of mere power, no matter how devastating. Such
an account may strike readers as incredibly austere and restrictive of
human rights protections. This, however, is not necessarily the case. It is
much easier for a political institution to find itself claiming authority than
one thinks. On the other hand, power-based theories linking human rights
obligations to factual effects either risk ruining the practice of human
rights by pitting it against the values of democracy and self-determination,
or unjustifiably limit obligations by making them contingent on the factual
ability to effect changes in individuals’ material well-being.
142. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 122, ¶ 159.
The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate
one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Mem-
ber to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of other Members. . .
so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort
and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Mem-
bers themselves in that Agreement.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 276 (June 27) (“A State is not bound to continue particular trade
relations longer than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty commitment or other
specific legal obligation.”); id. ¶ 88 (“Trade is not a duty of a State under general interna-
tional law but may only be a duty imposed by a treaty.”) (Oda, J., dissenting).
143. See Bartolus de Sassoferrato’s definition of jurisdiction as the “power to punish or
fix the limits of the laws over the terrified place.” CEDRIC RYNGAERT, UNILATERAL JURIS-
DICTION AND GLOBAL VALUES 65 (2015) (citing STUART ELDEN, THE BIRTH OF TERRITORY
222 (2013); Bartolus in Digest, L.16.239, in Opera, 8:699); MANN, supra note 80, at 13 (“Juris-
diction is concerned with the State’s right of regulation or, in the incomparably pithy lan-
guage of Mr. Justice Holmes, with the right ‘to apply the law to the acts of men.’”) (citing
Wedding v. Mayler, 192 U.S. 573, 584 (1904); Central Railroad v. Jersey City, 209 U.S. 473,
479 (1908)).
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The argument in this section takes two routes. The first, mentioned in
passing, is an argument in EU law proceeding from the principles of con-
sistency and coherence in Article 21(3) of the TEU. The second and more
important argument proceeds directly from international human rights
law, and claims that “human rights jurisdiction” arises if, and only if, a
political institution asserts political authority. First, however, it would be
useful to provide a brief description of the theory of human rights animat-
ing this paper.
A. Choice, Interest, and Human Rights as Public Fiduciary Law
As noted in the introduction, the paper justifies the practice of human
rights from an understanding of dignity as autonomy, or the simple idea
that no person is subject to the will of another. Such a view is generally
contrasted against a conception of dignity as wellbeing: the enjoyment of
certain basic material “interests” such as security and subsistence that are
necessary for human flourishing.144 The view of dignity-as-autonomy rec-
ognizes urgent interests as important, but not fundamentally so, because
they are not fundamentally distinctive about persons. Instead, the feature
that separates persons from “things” is that they have lives of their own,
such that they are able to set their own purposes. This is often described as
the “choice” theory of rights, because it views rights as stemming from the
capacity of persons to choose their own ends, rather than from their hav-
ing urgent needs.145
From this premise, it follows that there can be just three kinds of legal
relationships, or sets of rights and obligations legitimately enforced by co-
ercion: tortious, contractual, and fiduciary.146 The reasoning may be sum-
marized as follows: A thing is an entity that may be both possessed and
used at the same time; if the dignity of persons resides in not being treated
as things, this means simply that they cannot be possessed and used at the
same time. Thus, persons may first possess or use things in pursuit of their
purposes. This is the structure of tort and property rights. Second, persons
may use other persons, as long as they do not also possess them. This is the
structure of contractual rights, which are rights to the consensually granted
deeds of others. Your employer gets to use you and your skills for her
ends, but you can always quit. Third, persons may sometimes tell you what
to do, by deciding for you. Your attorney’s decision to accept a settlement
offer, or your agent’s decision to accept a delivery both bind you. How-
ever, if others possess you in this way, they may not also use you.
Whatever decisions they make in respect of you must be for your benefit,
not theirs. Thus, you may legitimately be subject to the decisions of others,
144. See WILLIAM EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTS, ch. 7 (2d ed., 2012)
(comparing choice and interest theories of rights).
145. See generally RIPSTEIN, supra note 126, ch. 2 on the “The Innate Right of
Humanity.”
146. Ripstein, supra note 111, at 19 (triangulating rights in terms of possession and use).
Spring 2016] EU’s HR Obligations 505
but never to their necessitating choice. This last category describes the
structure of fiduciary relations.
The same fiduciary principles apply to relations of political author-
ity.147 In private fiduciary relationships, the beneficiary always needs the
trustee in order to access the property that is hers; she cannot exercise her
rights on her own.148 The same is true of authority. Civil government ad-
ministers our moral rights and duties for us and on our behalf, akin to a
trustee administering property for a beneficiary. We have rights, say, not
to be assaulted, and obligations, say, not to defraud others. The securing of
these rights however, cannot be done privately,149 but, instead, requires
the setting up of civil government to enforce them in a systematic fashion,
creating positive law on the basis of each individual’s equal political status
within the political community. Thus, authority is not just compatible with
freedom, but necessary for it. Authoritative orders are binding because, by
complying, you manifest your freedom to set your own purposes; you act
according to a law you can give to yourself. The private fiduciary law is
provided to ensure private fiduciary relations do not degenerate into ex-
ploitation. Similarly, human rights are the principles of public law by
which persons ensure their relations with their political authorities do not
degenerate into domination. They are the legal means by which individual
subject-beneficiaries can hold their public fiduciary to account.150
Conceiving human rights as law governing the fiduciary relationship
between subject persons and public authorities is preferable to viewing
147. See id.at 17-18; RIPSTEIN, supra note 126, ch. 7. The difference between a private
fiduciary and the state as a ‘public’ fiduciary is that the state cannot act through individual
unilateral decisions, but only through law made, interpreted, and enforced publicly and sys-
tematically as an expression of an ‘omnilateral’ will. See also PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM:
A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 8 (1999) (“The commonwealth or republican
position. . . sees the people as trustor, both individually and collectively, and sees the state as
trustee: in particular, it sees the people as trusting the state to ensure a dispensation of non-
arbitrary rule.”).
148. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 106, at 44-46 (setting out and summarizing the Kant-
ian argument for parental authority over a child as arising from the child’s right to their
parents’ care, which in turn arises out of parents’ unilaterally having brought the child into
the world).
149. Under Kantian theory, rights are impossible in a state of nature because “(e)ach
person is entitled to act on his own judgment . . . not in the sense that each can rightfully act
in bad faith, but because there is nothing else on which anyone could act.” Ripstein, supra
note 111, at 29. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 126, ch. 6.
150. Evan Fox-Decent, From Fiduciary States to Joint Trusteeship of the Atmosphere:
The Right to a Healthy Environment through a Fiduciary Prism, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND
THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 253, 256 (Ken Coghill et al. eds., 2013)
According to Kant, all persons have an innate right to as much freedom as can be
reconciled with the freedom of everyone else. The purpose of law on this account
is to honour the dignity of all persons by enshrining legal rights within a regime of
secure and equal freedom, such that no person can unilaterally impose terms of
interaction on others. Within Kant’s regime of secure and equal freedom, fiduciary
obligations ensure that those who possess and exercise unilateral administrative
powers over others’ legal or practical interests are precluded from denying others’
innate right to equal freedom through domination or instrumentalization.
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them as “tort-like.” Whereas tortious rights are “horizontal” claims
against other equal private persons, human rights are resolutely “vertical,”
in that they imply obligations on the part of political institutions in their
own right, and not derivatively on behalf of individuals.151 This is why
states and political institutions are the primary addressees of human rights
claims,152 which in turn means that human rights are in fact constitutional
rights.153 Recall how it perennially has to be explained that the right to
food is not a right to be fed, but that food be available and accessible.154
The same is true of civil and political rights. The human right against tor-
ture is not a right not to be tortured by anyone per se. Rather, it is a right
to a reasonable social guarantee against being tortured. It is not in and of
itself a human rights violation for your neighbor to take you into her dun-
geon and waterboard you. Instead, it is a crime or a tort, and should be
posited, interpreted, and enforced accordingly. A human rights violation
obtains only if these are wanting. Ultimately, human rights do not respond
to private moral failures; to be a victim of a human rights violation, your
entire society must fail you.
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 50 (1945, re-
printed in 2013)
[T]he sovereign national State . . . is not an end unto itself but the trustee of the
welfare and of the final purpose of man. In that scheme of things it would be for
international society to ensure the fulfilment of that trust through a fundamental
enactment—an International Bill of the Rights of Man—conceived, not as a decla-
ration of principles, but as part of positive law, as part of the constitutional law
both of States and of the society of States at large.
151. See Samantha Besson, The allocation of anti-poverty rights duties, in POVERTY AND
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LEGAL SYSTEM 408, 417 (Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer
ed., 2014). However, Besson argues that private individuals have ‘residual’ or ‘subsidiary’
duties under human rights, these arise only before civil government has come into being or
after it has collapsed. Id. at 417, 421. The argument presented here disagrees, holding instead
that human rights are fully institutional.
152. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13-15, 109 (2009) (ar-
guing that “[h]uman rights apply in the first instance to the political institutions of states”).
153. See Johan Karlsson Schaffer, The point of the practice of human rights: Interna-
tional concern or domestic empowerment? (Feb. 13, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2564514 (last visited Aug. 1, 2016); Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights
as International Constitutional Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 749 (2008); Loizidou v. Turkey, 23
Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 75 (describing the ECHR “as a constitutional instrument of European
public order (ordre public)”).
154. See, e.g., Katarina Tomas̆evski, Human Rights Indicators: The Right to Food as a
Test Case, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 111, 148 (Philip Alston & Katarina Tomas̆evski eds., 1984)
(“. . . common sense would plead against a ‘right to be fed’, as the very term implies a humili-
ation of those who are being fed.”); Robert E. Robertson, The Right to Food-Canada’s Bro-
ken Covenant, 6 CAN. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 185, 188 (1989-1990) (“. . . the right to food is not
synonymous with the right to be fed, for that implies an unhealthy dependence upon
others.”); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Adequate Food:
Fact Sheet No. 34, 3 (Apr. 10, 2010) http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Fact-
Sheet34en.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (listing under “Common misconceptions about the
right to food” a heading entitled “The right to food is NOT the same as a right to be fed”).
Spring 2016] EU’s HR Obligations 507
The vast bulk of human and constitutional rights practice denies direct
horizontal effect against private actors, preferring instead ‘indirect’ appli-
cation through the private or criminal law.155 There are, of course, a few
jurisdictions where constitutional rights are directly enforceable against
private actors,156 but these provisions have given rise to very little juris-
prudence.157 The fiduciary nature of human rights is also demonstrated by
the remedies awarded. In tort relationships, the plaintiff and the defendant
were originally strangers to one another, and would have remained stran-
gers, had it not been for the defendant’s tort. A damages award seeks to
restore this original estrangement.158 In contrast, fiduciary remedies pre-
sume a unity between the trustee and the beneficiary, such that the trustee
is also accountable, and not just liable as if to a stranger.159 As was per-
haps best expressed by Nugent JA of the South African Court of Appeal:
Where the conduct of the state, as represented by the persons who
perform functions on its behalf, is in conflict with its constitutional
155. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (finding that although private indi-
viduals are free to include racially restrictive covenants in property deeds, Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause forbids governments from enforcing them); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding the First Amendment protects newspapers
from being sued for libel in state courts for making false defamatory statements about official
conduct of public officials, unless made with malice or reckless disregard for truth.); Retail,
Wholesale, & Dep’t Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573
(Can.) (finding rights in Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms do not in-
validate rules of judge-made common law at issue in private litigation. Courts must neverthe-
less apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner consistent with Charter
values, thereby leaving some room for the indirect horizontal effect of Charter rights.)
156. See, e.g., Art. 43. CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.); Ghana Const.
art. 12(1); Malawi Const. § 15(1).
157. See Aoife Nolan, Holding non-state actors to account for constitutional economic
and social rights violations: Experiences and lessons from South Africa and Ireland, 12 INT’L
CONST. L. 61, 65, 88, passim (2014) (observing the general dearth of jurisprudence finding
horizontal human rights); Stuart Woolman, The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights, 124 S.
AFR. L.J. 762, 763 (2007) (observing the Constitutional Court’s “persistent refusal to engage
in the direct application of the Bill of Rights” despite the explicit grant in Section 8(2) of the
South African Constitution). The Constitutional Court has held rights to have direct
horizontality in only two out of the many thousands of cases it has disposed of: Khumalo v.
Holomisa, 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at ¶ 33 (S. Afr.) (“[T]he right to freedom of expression is of
direct horizontal application.”); Juma Musjid Primary School v. Ahmed Asruff Essay N.O.,
2011 (29) BCLR 10 (CC) at ¶ 60 (S. Afr.) (holding a private landowner had “a negative
constitutional obligation not to impair the [students’] right to a basic education” by evicting
their school).
158. See ANDREW BURROWS, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 10-11
(1998). See also Arthur Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1957, 1965 (2007) (“The core idea is that tort law protects people in the means that they
already happen to have. One person wrongs another by either depriving him of means that
he has at his disposal, or using means that belong to him in ways that he has not
authorized.”).
159. See, e.g., Speight v. Gaunt, [1883] 22 Ch. D. 727, 739 (Eng.) (“[O]n general princi-
ples a trustee ought to conduct the business of the trust in the same manner than an ordinary
prudent man of business would conduct his own, and that beyond that there is no liability or
obligation . . .”).
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duty to protect rights in the Bill of Rights in my view the norm of
accountability must necessarily assume an important role in deter-
mining whether a legal duty ought to be recognized in any particu-
lar case. The norm of accountability, however, need not always
translate constitutional duties into private law duties enforceable
by an action for damages, for there will be cases in which other
appropriate remedies are available for holding the state to
account.160
This reasoning also animates Article 41 of the ECHR, which provides for
“just satisfaction” to victims of human rights violation only as in extraordi-
nary circumstances.161
The “public fiduciary law” conception of human rights is preferable to
those by John Rawls and Charles Beitz depicting human rights primarily
as reasons for interference in other political communities.162 Characteriz-
ing human rights this way tends to restrict human rights to rights against
the most egregious conduct, such as torture and genocide, and to deny that
socioeconomic rights, women’s rights, and rights to political participation,
constitute human rights proper, even though they make up a great deal of
the practice.163 In contrast, the authority-based theory avoids these diffi-
160. See Minister of Safety and Security v. Van Duivenboden, 2002 (6) SA (SCA) 431, ¶
21 (S. Afr.). See also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (finding constitutional dam-
ages unavailable where “any alternative, existing process for protecting the [constitutionally
recognized] interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from
providing a new and freestanding damages remedy,” and even if so, if there are “any special
factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation”); R (Green-
field) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 14 (HL), ¶ 19 (Lord
Bingham of Cornhill) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (holding that the Human Rights Act
1998 “is not a tort statute” and that “[i]ts objects are different and broader.”); Chief Consta-
ble of Hertfordshire v. Van Colle, [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 A.C. 225 (HL), ¶ 138 (Lord
Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (“Where civil actions are
designed essentially to compensate claimants for their losses, Convention claims are intended
rather to uphold minimum human rights standards and to vindicate those rights.”).
161. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524 (1979), ¶ 46 (holding it “not
necessary to afford the applicant any just satisfaction other than that resulting from the find-
ing of a violation of his rights”); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (Art. 50), 5 Eur. H.R. Rep.
573, ¶ 18 (1983) (holding that changes in Northern Irish legislation prompted by the merits
decision constituted sufficient remedy, obviating the need for pecuniary damages); Case of
OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia (Just Satisfaction), App. No. 14902/04, Eur.
Ct. H.R., ¶51 (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-
145730&filename=001-145730.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (awarding EUR 1.9 billion for
pecuniary damages, but holding unanimously that the finding of a violation constituted in
itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant
company).
162. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES: WITH, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON
REVISITED 79 (2001) (§10.2: “Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a
reasonable Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and
they specify limits to a regime’s internal autonomy.”); BEITZ, supra note 152, at 8 (human
rights practice “consists of a set of norms that regulate the behavior of states together with a
set of modes or strategies of action for which violations of the norms may count as reasons”).
163. See Schaffer, supra note 153, at 10.
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culties by designating the protection of equal freedom within political
communities as the primary point and purpose of human rights. Moreover,
while Beitz’ and Rawls’ accounts generally paint human rights as tools of
international relations, the “public fiduciary law” theory illuminates the
importance of human rights at the domestic level as law, the single most
valuable development in the history of the human rights movement.164
The authority-based account therefore situates human rights neatly
alongside the other two liberal ideals of the rule of law and democracy, as
expressed in Article 21 of the TEU. More appealingly, it provides a pic-
ture of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy as integrated and
mutually supporting, rather than as incompatible goods that must be
traded off against each other. However, it sits very uneasily with a central
orthodoxy of the human rights movement: that individuals have human
rights purely by virtue of being human.165 Instead, human rights depend
upon the possession of a particular status: being a subject of authority. In
this regard, this Article recalls Hannah Arendt’s declaration that that
human beings are naked outside of the state, and that it is membership in
a political community that renders meaningful the “right to have
rights.”166 As shall shortly be demonstrated, this too is a central feature of
the European human rights tradition.167 What this Article calls “Arendt’s
loophole” obtains when the individual never came within the scope of a
duty-bearer’s authority in the first place.
At this point, both a complication and a warning must be introduced.
First the complication: the conception of human rights described here
faces two kinds of competitors. The first are those conceptions of human
rights as responding to power, like causes of action in tort.168 To reiterate,
164. BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 121 (2009) (legalization serves the function of “making it clearer just
what compliance [with human rights obligations] requires”); Jack Donnelly, The Virtues of
Legalization, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 67, 74 (Saladin Meckled-Garcia & Başak Çali
eds., 2006) (“[T]he law, largely independent of its substance, has a certain authority and
normative force . . . the critical leverage provided by legal authority can be of real signifi-
cance, especially in the long run.”). See also Schaffer, supra note 153, at 18.
165. See, e.g., Charles Beitz, Human Rights and the Law of Peoples, in THE ETHICS OF
ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND THE DISTANT NEEDY 193, 196 (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2004)
(referring to this as the “orthodox” view of human rights); A JOHN SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION
AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 185 (2001) (“. . . human rights are
rights possessed by all human beings (at all times and in all places), simply in virtue of their
humanity . . . Human rights are those natural rights that are innate and that cannot be lost
(that is, that cannot be given away, forfeited, or taken away.”).
166. Hannah Arendt, The Decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man,
in THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (2nd ed., Meridian Books 1958) (1951).
167. See ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: FROM ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 171-389 (2010) (detailing the ECHR’s origins in a “collective pact against
totalitarianism”).
168. See, e.g., Christian Reus-Smit, Human rights in a global ecumene, 87 INT’L AFF.
1205, 1210 (2011) (depicting human rights as ‘power mediators’ that “materially weak actors
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human rights respond to authority. However, it is also ranged against those
conceptions which understand human rights as responding to authority,
but authority as described from “interest” theories of rights. There are
many surface resemblances between this Article’s arguments and that of
the interest-theoreticians, including the conception of political authority as
denoting fiduciary obligation.169 For this reason, this Article takes issue
mostly with the first set of competitors, while borrowing generously from
the latter. In particular, this Article is indebted to Samantha Besson’s ac-
count of human rights jurisdiction, which relies upon an interest-based
definition of human rights but “ties them to the exercise of political and
legal authority.”170
Next, the warning: it is crucial to keep in mind the difference between
two distinct uses of the word “authority”—“authority to perform actions,”
or authorization, and “authority over persons” which in turn gives rise to a
distinction between de jure and de facto authority. De jure authority per-
tains to the sense in which acts by officials belonging to institutions gov-
erned by a legal framework are carried out with authority. It is therefore a
combination of “authority to perform certain acts” and “authority over
persons.”171 In contrast, de facto authority consists solely of authority over
persons. It need not be valid in terms of its pedigree. A judge who issues
an injunction improperly does so without legal authorization, but you are
nonetheless bound by it until it is discharged. Despite having no legal au-
thorization, the judge has acted as if she does. In this sense we say ultra
can invoke to alter the power relationship between themselves and materially preponderant
political agents or institutions, usually sovereign states”).
169. See e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM 5 (1986) (“[Governments] do not
have a legitimate interest of their own. The only interest a government is entitled to pursue is
that of its subjects.”); Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accounta-
bility of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2013) (arguing, on Grotian
and Lockean interest-based theories, that such fiduciary duties are owed not just to subjects,
but to all humanity).
170. Besson, supra note 31, at 860-61. Besson subscribes to a ‘protected’ interest theory
of human rights, whereby “a human right exists qua moral right when an interest is a suffi-
cient ground or reason to hold someone else (the duty-bearer) under a (categorical and ex-
clusionary) duty to respect that interest against certain standard threats vis-à-vis the right-
holder.” Samantha Besson, The Egalitarian Dimension of Human Rights, ARCHIV FÜR
SOZIAL-UND RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE BEIHEFT 19, 33 (2012). However, she also observes that
“[w]hat is inviolable is not the interest . . . but the fact that everyone without exclusion ought
to benefit from its protection and hence from the right to have rights that protect it.” Id. at
36. While a detailed critique of Besson is beyond the scope of this paper, it is submitted that
rights do not intermediate between interests and obligations, but are conceptually prior to
interests. An “interest” can never be a “sufficient reason” to impose obligations (that is, a
duty enforceable by violence) upon others. Only a right can do that. Interests are weighty
only if one has a right to their satisfaction, and that obtains only if it is necessary for auton-
omy. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 68-73 (2016) (draft manuscript on file with
author) (criticizing “protected interest” theories of rights in private law).
171. RAZ, supra note 113, at 19. See also FOX-DECENT, supra note 106, at 90-91 (defin-
ing ‘de facto sovereignty’ as the “brute ability to govern through effective institutions” and
‘de jure sovereignty’ as “the state’s authority to do so”, the latter further separating into legal
and political bases of sovereignty).
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vires acts are nevertheless carried out “under color of law.” De facto au-
thorities do not simply “exert naked power (e.g. through terrorizing a pop-
ulation or manipulating it) . . . [but] act. . . under the guise of
legitimacy.”172 The necessary and sufficient condition for human rights ob-
ligations is “authority over persons,” not “authority to perform actions.”
Human rights law prevents political institutions from treating the human
beings they assert de facto political authority over as de jure outsiders,
thereby denying them the right to have rights. They may not be heard to
disclaim their responsibility on municipal legal grounds. The “supply-side”
of authority is irrelevant.
B. The Article 21(3) TEU Principle of Consistency/Coherence
To recall Section I, the principle of consistency or coherence blurs the
line between the European Union’s external and internal policies: the Lis-
bon Treaty “[singles] out consistency as the guiding principle for EU ac-
tion abroad and at home,” and “consistency of EU action is as important
internally as externally.”173 Consistency is understood as the mere “ab-
sence of contradictions, whereas coherence refers to positive connec-
tions,”174 such that “consistency” is about not tripping over each other’s
toes, while “coherence” evokes the idea of “joined-up governance.” Leon-
hard den Hertog and Simon Stroß find the principle of consistency or co-
herence to be not “well substantiated [as a] constitutional principle of EU
law,” and that the “case law of the [CJEU] explicitly dealing with the prin-
ciple is scarce and lacks concretization.”175 Ester Herlin-Karnell and The-
odore Konstantinidis try to identify why this is the case with respect to
“vertical” consistency between individual member state and the European
Union policy. They conclude that the CJEU’s vertical consistency jurispru-
dence is neither “value-driven, nor does it forge a constitutional interpre-
tative tool in the Dworkinian sense of consistency as integrity [but] is
instead tilting towards a ‘constitutional diktat’ based on the methodical
172. Joseph Raz, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 1003, 1005 (2006) (citations omitted).
173. Ester Herlin-Karnell, The EU as a Promoter of Values and the European Global
Project, in THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SHAPING OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 89, 97
(Dmitry Kochenov & Fabian Amtenbrink eds., 2014). See also Marise Cremona, Coherence
in European Union foreign relations law, in EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: LEGAL AND POLIT-
ICAL PERSPECTIVES 55, 77 (Panos Koutrakos ed., 2011). Note, ‘coherence’ does not appear in
the English language version of the Treaty of Lisbon, which speaks only of ‘consistency.’
However, the same concept is rendered in German as Kohärenz, in French as cohérence, and
in Spanish as coherencia. See Leonhard den Hertog & Simon Stroß, Coherence in EU Exter-
nal Relations: Concepts and Legal Rooting of an Ambiguous Term, 18 EUR. FOREIGN AFF.
REV. 373, 375 (2013). This Article cannot comment on these linguistic matters.
174. GEERT DE BAERE, CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS
251 (2008); See also Cremona, supra note 173, at 77; Christian Tietje, The Concept of Coher-
ence in the TEU and the CFSP, 2 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 211, 212 (1997); Pascal Gauttier,
Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the European Union, 10 EUR. L.J. 23,
40-41 (2004).
175. Hertog & Stroß, supra note 173, at 378.
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application of coercive constitutional principles to justify EU competence
and ensure the maximum effectiveness of EU law. . .”176 As a result, the
CJEU’s jurisprudence on the principle of coherence displays little more
than an “adherence to a line of judgment and a certain mode of conduct
which is historically crafted by definition and which is not attached to a
clear political goal.”177
A thin, pragmatic conception about efficiency maximization is indeed
incapable of giving much legal guidance.178 However, the fact that the Eu-
ropean Union asserts authority in the wider world requires us to revisit the
concepts of consistency and coherence. Given that it is founded upon po-
litical values179 rather than an imagined community, whatever reasons jus-
tify the authority of the European Union’s acts within its territory should
also regulate its exercise outside of that territory. One may object that
Article 3(1) of the TEU specifies the European Union’s purpose as to
“promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples,” thereby ap-
parently committing it to European Union citizens in a way that cannot be
extended to distant strangers. This objection is unsupportable. Everything
turns upon the meaning of “its peoples.” If and to the extent that the Eu-
ropean Union asserts authority over distant strangers, they become con-
structive members of the European Union’s political community.180
C. An Authority-based Theory of Human Rights Jurisdiction
As described in Section II(A), states and IOs bear responsibility only
for the protection of human rights within their “state jurisdiction.” This
Article argues that this term cannot be understood as a function of power,
such as “capability” or “control” over territory, but only in terms of a po-
litical institution’s claims of political authority over persons. For three rea-
sons, this Article relies on the case-law of the Strasbourg Court, rather
than that of other bodies. First, because Article 6(2) of the TEU requires
the European Union to accede to the ECHR, and because Article 6(3) of
the TEU provides that the ECHR will constitute general principles of EU
176. Ester Herlin-Karnell & Theodore Konstadinides, The Rise and Expressions of
Consistency in EU Law: Legal and Strategic Implications for European Integration, 15 CAM-
BRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 139, 152 (2013).
177. Id. at 153.
178. For a recent demonstration of this proposition see Case T-512/12, Polisario ¶¶ 149-
58 (rejecting the Front Polisario’s argument that the EU-Morocco Association Agreement
violated the principle of consistency).
179. See TEU art. 2.
180. Samantha Besson, Human rights and democracy in a global context: decoupling
and recoupling, 4 ETHICS & GLOBAL POL. 19, 23 (2011)
Human rights protect those interests tied to equal political membership and whose
disrespect would be tantamount to treating them as outsiders. . . human rights
work as political irritants and mechanisms of gradual inclusion that lead to the
extension of the political franchise and in some cases of citizenship itself to new
subjects in the community.
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law alongside the “constitutional traditions common to the Member
States,” the ECHR jurisprudence will have significant bearing upon the
delineation of the scope of the EU provisions.181 There is, it is submitted,
a distinctly European tradition of human rights legal practice. Second, the
ECHR jurisprudence is far more developed than any of its counterparts.
Finally, the ECHR jurisprudence is broadly right.
If human rights obligations arise from relations of political authority
and obedience, it follows that the fundamental criterion for human rights
jurisdiction—the threshold to be met before a state or IO can have human
rights obligations with respect to an individual—is a relationship of au-
thority and obedience. Seeing it this way explains both the difference be-
tween the concepts of general jurisdiction and human rights
jurisdiction,182 as well as why they are related.183 Ideally, governments
make law only for their own citizens and residents, for which “territory”
serves as shorthand. Thus, their human rights jurisdiction normally covers
only their territory. However, states and IOs exceed these bounds from
time to time: sometimes properly, as when they assert authority extraterri-
torially pursuant to a recognized ground of jurisdiction, and sometimes
improperly, such as when they illegally invade and occupy other countries.
Such claims of de facto authority are illegal and therefore lacking authori-
zation, but must nevertheless be justified in the same way because they too
are made under the guise of legitimacy.184 In these exceptional situations,
a state or IO’s human rights jurisdiction expands accordingly. Thus, the
true measure of human rights jurisdiction is not the state or IO’s scope of
authority under the rules of general jurisdiction at international law, but
that claimed by the municipal legal order, whether validly or not.185
181. See Bartels, supra note 13, at 1077.
182. See MILANOVIC, supra note 30, at 21-34 (arguing that the Strasbourg Court failed
to grasp these differences in Banković).
183. The Strasbourg Court’s continues to insist that Article 1 ECHR ‘jurisdiction’ is
primarily territorial, with extraterritorial application obtaining in exceptional cases. Al-Skeini
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶ 131 (2011).
184. Besson, supra note 31, at 870-71
[W]hen domestic-law jurisdiction is exercised outside domestic boundaries, it may
sometimes overlap with jurisdiction under international law, albeit not necessarily.
Domestic- and international-law jurisdiction. . . necessarily overlap to the extent
that domestic law’s state jurisdiction is the object of jurisdiction under interna-
tional law. The former includes the latter, but also cases of unlawful exercise of
state jurisdiction under international law.
185. Id. at 870 (arguing that “the state jurisdiction at stake in Article 1 ECHR is clearly
a matter of law, but it is a matter of domestic law and not of international law. . .”). See also
MICHAł GONDEK, THE REACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: EXTRATER-
RITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 56-57 (2009) (observing that “a person
may in certain circumstances be within the jurisdiction of a state party to a human rights
treaty when he or she is outside state territory and an act of state affecting such person would
not pass a test of what is legal under the international law of jurisdiction”).
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In the following sections, we criticize two prominent arguments link-
ing human rights obligations to power rather than authority. The first, by
Yuval Shany, holds that they arise where an institution has the capability
to meet demands made under the title of human rights. The second, by
Marko Milanovic, claims that human rights are owed to all but limited by
considerations of feasibility, which depends on the type of control the in-
stitution has.
1. Capability
As is well known, Strasbourg jurisprudence on human rights jurisdic-
tion took many turns after Banković, culminating in Al-Skeini, in which
the Court discarded two holdings of the Banković decision: (1) that for
Article 1 of the ECHR jurisdiction to arise, the state party had to be able
to protect all the rights specified in the Convention, rather than a “divided
and tailored”186 version of it, and (2) the ECHR applied only within the
espace juridique of the Council of Europe, because the Convention was
intended by its drafters to benefit only Europeans.187 Instead, the Court
held that human rights jurisdiction arose where there was (1) state agent
authority and control over persons,188 or (2) effective control over terri-
tory.189 It then went on to find that the application fell within category (1),
because
[F]ollowing the removal from power of the Ba’ath regime and un-
til the accession of the interim Iraqi government, the United King-
dom (together with the United States of America) assumed in
Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be ex-
ercised by a sovereign government. In particular, the United
Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the mainte-
nance of security in south-east Iraq. In these exceptional circum-
stances, the Court considers that the United Kingdom, through its
soldiers engaged in security operations in Basra during the period
in question, exercised authority and control over individuals killed
in the course of such security operations, so as to establish a juris-
dictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for
the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.190
Yuval Shany, a member of the HRC, argues in favor of a “capability”
approach to human rights jurisdiction, on the grounds that Al-Skeini ap-
parently mirrors the HRC’s jurisprudence on the same.191 In Lopez Bur-
186. Banković v. Belgium and others, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, ¶ 75; overruled by
Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 137.
187. Id. ¶ 80.
188. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 133-37.
189. Id. ¶¶ 138-40.
190. Id. ¶ 149.
191. Yuval Shany, Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterri-
toriality in International Human Rights Law, 7 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 47, 54-60 (2013). See
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gos v. Uruguay, which involved the kidnapping, detention, and torture of
an Uruguayan national in Argentina by Uruguayan paramilitaries, the
HRC found that “it would be unconscionable to . . . interpret responsibil-
ity under [the ICCPR] as to permit a State Party to perpetrate violations
of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could
not perpetrate on its own territory.”192 This formula was adopted by the
Strasbourg Court in the Issa, Pad, and Isaak line of cases,193 where it held
(albeit obiter in Issa, where it was alleged but not proved that Turkish
soldiers had crossed over the border into Iraq and shot a number of shep-
herds), that “Article I of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to
allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the terri-
tory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own terri-
tory.”194 Finally, Shany invokes General Comment No. 31—the “most
authoritative summary to date of the HRC’s position on the extraterrito-
rial application”195—where the HRC held that
[A] State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that
State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State
Party. . . This principle also applies to those within the power or
effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its
territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or
effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a na-
tional contingent of a State Party assigned to an international
peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.196
According to Shany, the abovementioned passage in Al-Skeini incor-
porates this HRC principle into ECHR jurisprudence. In reading that pas-
sage, he observes that
also Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in
the Occupied Territories, 37 ISR. L. REV. 17, 71-76 (Spring 2003-2004) (arguing from HRC
jurisprudence that individuals fall within a state’s human rights jurisdiction if the projection
of that state’s power has potential impacts that are direct, significant, and foreseeable);
JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
WHO SHOULD INTERVENE? 36-38, 182 (2010) (assigning human rights duties on the basis of
capacity to achieve good consequences).
192. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Sergio Rubén López Burgos v. Uru., U.N. Doc. Supp. No.
40 (A/36/40) at 176 (1981). See also U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Samuel Lichtensztejn v. Uru., ¶
6(1), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40) (1983); U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Lilian Celiberti de
Casariego v. Uru., U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 185 (1981).
193. Pad and others v. Turkey, App. No. 60167/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 54 (June 28, 2007);
Isaak v. Turkey, App. No. 44587/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 19 (Sept. 28, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-87146; Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 71 (2004), http://hud
oc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-67460.
194. Issa, App. No. 31821/96, ¶ 71.
195. Shany, supra note 191, at 53.
196. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13,
¶ 10 (May 26, 2004).
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[I]t is perhaps interesting to note that the Court did not explicitly
base its decision in this dispositive paragraph on the belligerent
occupation of Basra by the Coalition forces . . . or on the legal
obligations that ensued from this particular state of affairs. It did,
instead, emphasize that the UK substituted in a functional sense
the authority of the local Iraqi government. Put differently, the
Court found that the UK was both capable and particularly well
situated to assume government responsibilities vis-à-vis the popula-
tion of Basra, including its obligations to protect their human
rights.197
This, however, was precisely the proposition described in the English
Court of Appeal as “utterly unreal.”198 Indeed, if British governance in
Southern Iraq was capable or well-situated, one may wonder if it is ever
possible to be incapable or poorly-situated. Tellingly, the Al-Skeini
formula is not the HRC’s “power and effective control,”199 but “authority
and control.”200 A better reading of that passage indicates that uppermost
in the Court’s mind was not the fact the Coalition forces were “capable”
or “well-situated” to exercise governmental powers, but that they had ac-
tually done so: they “assumed” public powers, and “exercised” authority
and control over the victims.201 It was irrelevant whether they had the
wherewithal to do it well.
Regarding theory, Shany deflects the foreseeable criticism that the ca-
pability approach imposes human rights obligations just because they can
be imposed, countering instead that feasibility is just the first criterion.202
In addition to being in a position where they are able to do so, it must
either be shown that (1) the impact of the obligation not being imposed
must be “direct, significant and foreseeable,” or (2) there must be a “legiti-
mate expectation” that the state in question will intervene, arising from
“special legal relations” between the state and the individual involved.203
Additional criterion (1) is a requirement of urgency, which does indeed
address the concern that human rights obligations are imposed too lightly.
Unfortunately, it accomplishes this rather too well; the requirements of
directness and significance reduce human rights obligations to humanita-
rian obligations, precluding less spectacular violations from redress. More-
over, the “special legal relationship” in additional criterion (2) is not a
normative relationship, but one where the state is “particularly well-situ-
197. Shany, supra note 191, at 60.
198. Al-Skeini and Ors, R (on the application of) v. Sec. of State for Def., [2005]
EWCA (Civ) 1609, ¶ 124, (Eng.) (per Brooke LJ).
199. General Comment No. 31, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶ 10.
200. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶ 149
(2011).
201. Id.
202. Shany, supra note 191, at 70.
203. Id. at 69-70.
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ated to protect that said individual.”204 It is, in effect, a higher capability
threshold; a state must not only be capable of bearing extraterritorial
human rights obligations, but also be “particularly well-situated.” If not
for Shany’s peculiar notion thereof, this might again raise the concern that
the amendments to the “capability” theory were unduly restrictive of a
state’s extraterritorial human rights obligations.
Moreover, Shany’s notion of “legitimate” consists only of results or
“output” legitimacy. However, human rights are deeply linked to “inputs”
such as political institutions and processes:
[A] key dimension of human rights and human rights duties that
tends to be downplayed by overlooking their supply-side is the
political dimension of human rights and the importance of egalita-
rian and hence democratic decision-making on those complex
moral issues of allocation of human rights obligations and respon-
sibilities for human rights.205
This then undermines output legitimacy, because measures imposed from
on high are unlikely to be internalized and may be abandoned lightly. In-
tervening purely on the basis of capability, even in urgent cases, would
ride roughshod over the self-determination of distant strangers. This does
not mean such interventions are never permitted or even obligatory, but it
does mean that something more than mere capability is necessary. Thus,
“legitimacy” requires an account of normativity, that is, of authority.
In this regard, the choice-based theory provides a more robust and
non-consequentialist justification of the importance of self-determination
than interest-based theories. If, as per interest theories, the point of politi-
cal authority is to help individuals comply better with their moral duties to
one another, and thereby protect their rights qua important interests in
security and subsistence, then self-determination can presumably be over-
ridden or “balanced” away if the intervening institution really does pro-
vide better protection against standard threats to the urgent interests
supposedly grounding rights. This, however, is contrary to conventional
intuitions. Few would consider another to have the right to make decisions
for them purely on the basis of their being more capable or well-suited to
do so. This intuition is also to be found in various legal regimes. A central
tenet of the law of occupation is that sovereignty can never be alienated by
military force, no matter how competent the occupant or incompetent the
ousted government.206 Interest-theories may attempt to account for this
by postulating that successful interferences are highly unlikely, and ought
therefore to be prohibited on a rule-utilitarian basis.207 However much
204. Id. at 69.
205. Besson, supra note 151, at 430.
206. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 6 (2012).
207. An instrumentalist argument may be extrapolated from Raz’s ‘normal justification
thesis,’ postulating that the “normal way to establish that a person has authority over another
person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which
apply to him. . . if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding
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history might appear to confirm this speculation, it cannot explain why this
general rule should not be departed from in exceptional situations. Some
occupying forces might genuinely be better at maintaining law and order
than the indigenous government.
The intuition that an occupying force can never be fully legitimate can
be accounted for if rights are understood as guarantees of autonomy
rather than of well-being. The law recognizes this by designating wrongs
rather than harms as its basic currency. There are many ways you can be
harmed without being legally wronged (as if a person operates a compet-
ing business that drives you into destitution), and wronged without being
harmed (as if someone enters your house without your permission but
does not damage anything). Indeed, you may even be wronged by some-
one who confers benefits upon you, such as if someone breaks into your
house to wash your dishes for you. This is because that person has used
you or your property for a purpose set by her rather than by you.208 Simi-
larly, an occupier who does not harm or perhaps even advances the mate-
rial interests of the inhabitants, nonetheless wrongs them formally. “Alien
control renders a people vulnerable to the will of another state or agency
and undermines the ability of the dominated people’s institutions to gov-
ern and represent their members. . . Ultimately, alien control of a nation
dominates the nation’s members as well as the nation’s collective legal
personality.”209 Human rights jurisdiction is therefore properly limited to
situations involving actual exercises of authority, and not mere factual ca-
pability to improve material well-being.
2. Control
In an exhaustive study of numerous human rights treaties, but with an
emphasis on the ECHR, Marko Milanovic concludes that the term “juris-
diction” in human rights treaties is best understood as “state control over
territory, and perhaps individuals.”210 From this premise, Milanovic con-
structs a model mirroring Bartels: negative obligations to respect are terri-
torially unlimited, while positive obligations to protect and fulfill are
and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him
directly.” RAZ, supra note 172, at 53-57. See also ROUGHAN, supra note 112, at 107-14 (argu-
ing that Raz’s service conception of authority is indeterminate in situations of conflicting
claims to authority, because competing authorities may advance different kinds of reasons
that an individual should comply with).
208. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 170, at 49 n.29.
209. Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights,
15 LEG. THEORY 301, 333 (2009). See also Mortimer N. Sellers, Republican Principles in
International Law, 11 CONN. J. INT’L L. 403, 416 (1996)
Self-governing nations provide a locus for establishing individual human rights.
But too much emphasis on universal human rights may obscure the primary value
of the nation, which lies in the continuity and large common projects that nations
make possible over generations in the lives of their citizens. Human rights could be
protected in a world republic, but collective identity could not.
210. MILANOVIC, supra note 30, at 262.
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“limited to those areas that are under the state’s effective control.”211 The
logic appears simple and elegant: human rights are “universal,” that is,
“direct and enforceable. . . vis-à-vis all individuals in the world” and it
does not take much not to violate them. Accordingly, Banković is wrongly
decided.212 However, their protections must also be “effective,” which
precludes “positive” obligations if one does not have a physical presence
in the territory, or control over relevant persons.213 To be sure, Milanovic
does “not advocat[e] a strict separation between negative and positive ob-
ligations . . . [but] a separation between those positive obligations which
require control over territory in order to be effective . . . and those obliga-
tions whose effectiveness depends only on the State’s control over its own
agents.”214 He postulates a class of exceptional positive human rights obli-
gations applying extraterritorially, on the basis that all that is needed to
ensure them is control over agents.
Thus, Milanovic provides a pragmatic compromise between competing
policies of universality and effectiveness,215 where what matters is the fac-
tual ability to achieve particular states of material well-being. He antici-
pates the authority-based theory of human rights jurisdiction, and argues
that limiting human rights jurisdiction only to those instances where states
act pursuant to some legal authorization “would open the door to abuse”
by allowing them to get away with clandestine violations committed solely
through brute power.216 While
an exercise of a legal power or authority by a state over an indi-
vidual outside its territory would suffice to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional threshold . . . [l]imiting the personal model to such
purported exercises of legal power . . . would be entirely arbitrary,
and would only serve to undermine the rule of law by creating a
perverse incentive for states to act outside their own legal system
if they wish to violate human rights.217
211. Id. at 263.
212. One might say that Milanovic offered his monograph as a passionate refutation of
Banković. See, e.g., id. at 264 (“Let me conclude by saying that I certainly do not suffer from
the naı̈ve belief that my proposed model of extraterritorial application will be adopted any
time soon. At least when it comes to Strasbourg, it requires a major departure from existing
jurisprudence, above all from Bankovic.”).
213. See id. at 56 (arguing that appeals to universality and human dignity cannot “over-
come the threshold criterion of state jurisdiction that is found in most human rights trea-
ties. . . these provisions have a purpose—they limit the obligations of contracting states to
those situations where these obligations could realistically be met and human rights effec-
tively protected”).
214. Id. at 215-16.
215. Id. at 263 (describing his rule as providing “the benefit of clarity and predictability,
[and] the best balance among its competitors between the conflicting demands of universality
and effectiveness”). See id. Ch. 3 on “Policy Behind the Rule”.
216. Id. at 206-07.
217. Id. at 207.
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This is precisely the misunderstanding warned about earlier, of equating
“authority” solely with “authority to perform actions.” To reiterate,
human rights obligations arise from “authority over persons,” not “author-
ity to perform actions.”
A bigger issue concerns Milanovic’s distinction between the treatment
of negative and positive obligations, the former being universal and the
latter mostly limited to territory under effective control. If this is right, the
EU can have no human rights obligations towards the distant strangers in
either of the hypothetical situations described in the introduction. Of the
exceptional category of positive obligations Milanovic deems as applying
extraterritorially, the prime example are “prophylactic and procedural ob-
ligations” to investigate killings. This is explained as (1) because such obli-
gations are closely connected to universally applicable negative
obligations, and (2) because all that is required of the duty-bearer is con-
trol and knowledge of the actions of its own agents.218 A state is not re-
quired to investigate an extraterritorial human rights violation in which its
own agents did not participate at all, unless the act was committed in a
territory under its effective control.219 The obligation to investigate a kill-
ing arises from the possibility that it may have been committed by a State
agent. Attribution is therefore key. While Milanovic distinguishes between
attribution and human rights jurisdiction, and criticizes early Strasbourg
cases for conflating them, prophylactic and procedural obligations to in-
vestigate constitute an exception where attribution is a prerequisite for
jurisdiction.220
Despite his prediction that his was “the only model of state jurisdic-
tion and extraterritorial application that is stable in the long run,”221 the
Strasbourg Court does not appear to have followed Milanovic’s prescrip-
tions. Banković would still be decided the same way today, albeit reasoned
differently, and this is unlikely to change.222 While there was some reason
to believe otherwise in the wake of the Issa, Pad, and Isaak line of cases,
218. Id. at 212-16.
219. See id. at 217 (arguing that the “positive procedural” obligation to investigate kill-
ings would not obtain “were they done by third parties, be they insurgents or indeed the
soldiers of an allied country. . . since they took place in an area outside its jurisdiction, and it
would in fact be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the [state party] to conduct an
effective investigation without having control over the territory.”).
220. Id. at 51-52. See generally id. at 41-52 (discussing difference between human rights
jurisdiction and state responsibility).
221. Id. at 263.
222. Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121,
132 (2012) (“Al-Skeini leaves unchanged the outcome of Bankovic.”). See also LORD DYSON
MR, ESSEX LECTURE 2014: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: NOW ON A FIRMER FOOTING, BUT IS IT A SOUND ONE? 19
(Jan. 30, 2014) https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/
lord-dyson-speech-extraterritorial-reach-echr-300114.pdf
It is likely that, if it were faced with the facts of Bankovic today, the Court would
reach the same conclusion as it did in 2001, but its analysis would now depend on
the degree of authority and control the respondent State exercised over the appli-
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these precedents are no longer persuasive in the wake of Al-Skeini.223
Specifically, his account of prophylactic and procedural obligations was
rejected in Jaloud v. Netherlands, which involved a fatal shooting of an
Iraqi by a Dutch soldier at a checkpoint manned by a Dutch battalion
participating in the United States and United Kingdom-led military coali-
tion, assisted by Iraqi troops under their command.224 As in Al-Skeini, it
was not the fact of the shooting that was at issue, but the failure to investi-
gate it. It was acknowledged there were severe obstacles to carrying out
such an investigation, with one concurring opinion criticizing the majority
for not emphasizing that the problem was not the conduct of the Dutch
soldiers, but that of the Dutch military courts.225 The Court pointedly held
“that the test for establishing the existence of ‘jurisdiction’ under Article 1
of the Convention has never been equated with the test for establishing a
State’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under general in-
ternational law,”226 a point driven home in Judge Spielmann’s concurring
opinion, which castigated the majority for even mentioning the subject.227
Instead, the Court held that the Netherlands’ human rights jurisdiction
arose simply because the applicant “met his death when a vehicle in which
he was a passenger was fired upon while passing through a checkpoint
manned by personnel under the command and direct supervision of a
Netherlands Royal Army officer.”228
Despite the Court’s unambiguity on the matter, Milanovic insists that
“attribution is an issue in every single case, Jaloud included . . . [because
cants, not where they were located or whether their cases could be squeezed into
one of the exceptional categories to territorial jurisdiction.
223. See the re-interpretation of Issa by the Strasbourg Court in Al-Skeini, discussed at
text to note 240.
224. Jaloud v. Netherlands, App. No. 47708/08, (Nov. 20, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-148367.
225. Id. ¶ 226. See also id. ¶ 4 (Joint Concurring Opinion of judges Casadevall, Berro-
Lefevre, Šikuta, Hirvelä, López Guerra, Sajó & Silvis).
226. Id. ¶ 154 (citing Catan v. Moldova and Russia [GC], Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No.
43370/04, 8252/05 & 18454/06, ¶ 115 (Oct. 19, 2012)), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
114082).
227. Id. ¶¶ 5 & 7 (Spielmann, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority’s discussion of
attribution as being “ambiguous, subsidiary, and incomprehensible,” as well as unnecessary
and likely to cause confusion).
228. Id. ¶ 152. Jane Rooney remarks that the reasoning in this crucial paragraph
more closely resembles an attribution test rather than a control over the territory
or authority and control over an individual test as the statement aims to establish
which actor had the requisite control over the checkpoint rather than aiming to
determine whether the type of control exercised over the individual was sufficient
to establish jurisdiction over that individual.
Jane M. Rooney, The Relationship between Jurisdiction and Attribution after Jaloud v.
Netherlands, 61 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 8 (2014). To the contrary, the Court’s pronouncement
actually does specify the “type” of “control” that gives rise to jurisdiction: the manning of a
checkpoint under the actor’s supervision.
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for] a state to be responsible for any violation of the Convention, some
conduct of a living, breathing human being has to be attributed to that
state.”229 Milanovic rightly distinguishes between the concepts of attribu-
tion and human rights jurisdiction: “Attribution of conduct is a question of
whether the acts or omissions of a living, breathing human being (or group
of human beings) should in law be regarded as the conduct of a state. . . .”
Human rights jurisdiction, on the other hand, “poses two different ques-
tions – does a state exercise effective control of an area or territory in
which the victim of the alleged human rights violation is located (spatial
model of jurisdiction), or does the state, through its agents, exercise au-
thority and control over the individual victim of the alleged human rights
violation (personal model of jurisdiction).” He also once again correctly
distinguishes between “jurisdiction-establishing conduct” and “violation-
establishing conduct.” The Court could not have decided as it did without
attributing both forms of conduct to the Netherlands, but for Milanovic,
this means Jaloud must have involved “not one, but two, attribution
inquiries.”230
Milanovic sees “jurisdiction-establishing conduct” in terms of “acts or
omissions by which a state, through its organs or agents, establishes con-
trol over an area or control over an individual.”231 Because physical “con-
trol” or the factual ability to achieve levels of well-being is the touchstone
of his theory, Milanovic places great importance upon factual and legal
causal links between the putative rights-claimants and corresponding duty-
bearers. Attribution is key. “When a state exercises jurisdiction, i.e. con-
trol over a foreign territory or individuals, it by definition needs to do so
through its agents, i.e. persons whose acts are attributable to it.”232 It must
follow that there can be no Dutch human rights jurisdiction if (1) no in-
volvement by Dutch soldiers in the killing was imaginable, or (2) any such
acts of involvement were attributable to the United Kingdom, under
whose orders its soldiers operated. If there was no imaginable Dutch in-
volvement in the shooting, nothing the Netherlands did could have had
any bearing upon the claimants’ well-being. Even if there was some bear-
ing on the claimants’ well-being, the Netherlands would not have been
accountable, since its soldiers were under the direction of the United
Kingdom.
The flaw in this reasoning can be revealed by expressing the processes
of attribution and jurisdiction more pithily. An attribution analysis essen-
tially asks “Who did this?” In contrast, an analysis of human rights juris-
diction asks “Who’s in charge?” To wit, Milanovic understands being “in
charge” with having physical control over land or persons. A moment’s
229. Marko Milanovic, Jurisdiction, Attribution, and Responsibility in Jaloud, EJIL:
TALK! (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/jurisdiction-attribution-and-responsibility-in-
jaloud/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
230. Id.
231. Id. One wonders how one may establish physical control over land or persons by
omission.
232. MILANOVIC, supra note 30, at 51.
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pause, however, reveals that this is overstated: it is possible to be “in
charge” without going so far as deploying boots on the ground. As demon-
strated by the discussion of territorial extension, it is possible to effect
profound changes in a particular place purely by creating legal effects; that
is, by claiming authority over persons there. Indeed, there is even a sense
in which one can be in charge but unable to do anything.233 In Ilaşcu, the
Court held that despite having lost control over a portion of its territory to
the Russian-supported Transdniestrian puppet government, Moldova still
retained positive obligations to use all of the diplomatic, economic, judi-
cial, and other measures within its ability to secure the ECHR rights of
individuals held in the breakaway region.234 To be sure, it is unclear
whether the Court would rule the same way today, in the light of the Al-
Skeini formula of “effective control over territory” or “authority and con-
trol over persons.” Nevertheless, it may still meaningfully be said that a
state or IO claiming to be or holding itself out as “in charge” of certain
persons ought to act like it; its pretensions, however risible, give rise to
obligations.235
If human rights jurisdiction is understood as rooted in claims of au-
thority (normative power) over persons, rather than control or factual
power over land, the link between attribution and jurisdiction is broken. It
becomes possible to explain Jaloud without claiming that the Strasbourg
judges were twice engaging in attribution analysis despite vociferously de-
nying it. There is no need to trace—or manufacture—causation to acts of
control over territory or persons, because “jurisdiction-establishing con-
duct” consists instead of a claim of authority over persons. As argued
above, authority implies fiduciary obligations of loyalty, which include lia-
bility for omissions.236 A parent has a positive obligation to rescue his
child from drowning in a puddle, not because it is possible that he might
have pushed the child into that puddle, but simply because he is that
child’s fiduciary. Likewise, it could legitimately have been expected of the
Netherlands, having held itself out as the authority over people passing
233. See DAVID L. ATTANASIO, THE STATE OBLIGATION TO PROTECT, 105-09 (2015)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles), http://escholarship
.org/uc/item/09f0w7h8#page-1.
234. Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, App. No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2004-VII, ¶¶ 332-
52. Milanovic’s commitment to a view of human rights jurisdiction as physical power over
land or persons leads to him concluding that Ilaşcu is wrongly decided. See MILANOVIC, supra
note 30, at 106-07. This Article differs. Note, moreover, that the Strasbourg Court’s approach
in Ilaşcu was mirrored by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Pueblo Bello Mas-
sacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
140, ¶¶ 119-27 (Jan. 31, 2006) (holding Colombia responsible for human rights violations
committed by paramilitaries in region where government had tenuous control).
235. Cf. Besson, supra note 31, at 873 (arguing that in order to give rise to human rights
jurisdiction, the claim of authority by the putative duty-bearer must be accompanied by “ef-
fective power” and “overall control [which] should be effective and exercised, and not merely
claimed”).
236. See generally ATTANASIO, supra note 233, chs. 3 & 6 (explaining why the state duty
to protect results from its role as a public fiduciary, rather than from its having created or
potential to create dangerous conditions).
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through the checkpoint, that a shooting occurring under its nose not go
uninvestigated, regardless of who did it. The responsibility involved here is
not causal, but managerial.
Moreover, even if the Dutch soldiers had in fact been placed “at the
disposal” of the United Kingdom or of any other power,237 the Nether-
lands could not have disclaimed responsibility on the grounds that its
soldiers were only following superior orders.238 Once again, the criterion
for human rights obligations is not authority to perform acts but authority
over persons. The pedigree or chain of authorization is irrelevant. If the
Dutch troops involved had indeed been at the disposal of the United King-
dom, the proper solution would have been to find that both the Nether-
lands’ and the United Kingdom’s human rights jurisdiction had arisen.239
The finding of human rights jurisdiction has nothing to do with traceability
of consequences to a particular actor’s agency or with its being the last link
in a chain of command, but everything to do with its having claimed public
authority over a particular individual.
Finally, note the obiter discussion of Issa in Al-Skeini, where the Court
suggested that Turkish human rights jurisdiction would not have arisen on
the alleged facts of the case, but it might have, if the Iraqi shepherds had
been taken by Turkish forces to a nearby cave before they were shot.240
This is absurd under the control model, because incomprehensible as a
pragmatic compromise between universality and effectiveness. It is emi-
nently within a state’s power not to shoot someone, no matter where they
are. The authority-based theory provides an explanation: if the shepherds
had been shot where they stood, they would merely have been affected, in
the same way as the victims in Banković. However, for the brief duration
the individuals are being transported to the cave, one can say they were
being governed. This also explains why both negative obligations to re-
spect and positive obligations to protect and fulfill are subject to exactly
the same jurisdictional rules. Negative human rights obligations are not
owed universally to everyone, but only to subjects.241 By extension, the
237. The Court found otherwise. See Jaloud, App. No. 47708/08, ¶ 151.
238. This was indeed the approach taken in Behrami, where France successfully denied
jurisdiction because its actions in Kosovo were ultimately attributable to NATO. Behrami v.
France, App. No. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 85, ¶¶ 132-43, 151 (2007). See Marko
Milanović & Tatjana Papić, As Bad as it Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’s
Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 267
(2009) (criticizing Behrami).
239. Human rights duties may obtain if the state or IO procured or abetted another
state’s or IO’s human rights violations. See Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Adden-
dum—Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment
Agreements, Hum. Rts. Comm’n, UN Doc A/HRC/19/59/Add.5, ¶ 2.6 (Dec. 19, 2011) (cited
in Bartels, supra note 13, at 1081). However, Article 18 ARS and Article 16 ARIO require an
element of knowledge on the part of the coercing state not met by a mere failure to carry out
due diligence.
240. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶ 136
(2011).
241. Monica Hakimi, Toward a Legal Theory on the Responsibility to Protect, 39 YALE
J. INT’L L. 247, 268-69 (2014) (explaining this legal fact by observing that duties to respect
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limitation of the positive duty to protect to territory under effective con-
trol would be improper, if that would result in a public authority evading
its obligations to the governed. As Lord Dyson notes extrajudicially, “[i]f a
Contracting State has taken over control of the civil administration of the
foreign territory then its inability to control the situation is not a ticket out
of the Convention.”242 At the jurisdictional stage, “cannot” implies “ought
not”: to the extent the putative duty-bearer cannot fulfill its human rights
obligations, it ought not to have pretended to authority, and is precluded
from complaining about the onerousness of its obligations. Thus, positive
obligations cannot be knocked out as a rule at the admissibility stage. The
duty-bearer may be excused if it really cannot fulfill its obligations, but it
bears the burden of proving it has tried.243 The specification of human
rights obligations can be done only in the concrete circumstances of each
case, that is, at the merits.
3. Arendt’s Loophole
If authority is the touchstone of human rights obligations, this implies,
as suggested in the previous section, that a state or IO has no human rights
obligations if it controls a foreign territory without any pretense thereof.
As Besson observes, “military occupation with effective control over a ter-
ritory need not imply jurisdiction, because it may lack the normative ele-
ment of reason-giving and appeal for compliance. Another example may
be effective personal control by troops without, however, any normative
appeal besides the use of coercion.”244 Such situations may be less likely
to occur in the wake of Hassan, where the Strasbourg Court held that an
Iraqi individual taken into British custody fell within the U.K.’s human
rights jurisdiction, notwithstanding that this took place during the active
hostilities phase of an international conflict.245 Despite the fact that the
events in Hassan and Jaloud occurred during active conflicts, the require-
ment of “authority over persons” was fulfilled because the state party con-
cerned figuratively claimed an entitlement to tell the victims what to do,
and to force them to do as told. In addition, the reformulation of Issa in
Al-Skeini should address the problem of “black sites” and the treatment of
civilians during armed conflicts. Lastly, consider that controlling an area
through brute power alone is impossibly exhausting, and a political institu-
tion greatly lightens its burden by evoking a moral obligation of compli-
“balance the interest in protecting people from state intrusions against countervailing inter-
ests that justify such intrusion. The duty not to kill permits killings to protect innocents . . .”).
242. See DYSON, supra note 222, at 20.
243. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 166 (holding that compliance with positive duties is
an obligation of means rather than result, meaning the duty-bearer must demonstrate due
diligence).
244. Besson, supra note 31, at 876.
245. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 77 (2014) (citing
Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July
8)), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146501.
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ance. It is not effective control that is needed for authority, but authority
that needed for effective control.246
Nevertheless, the problem remains. The authority-based theory would
not cover situations where it is impossible to locate even a scintilla of de
facto authority, for instance in a pure Issa or Lopez Burgos situation of
drone strikes in faraway lands, or the poisoning of an exiled ex-secret
agent. As unsettling as this is, it is in perfect accordance with the result in
Banković, which, as stated earlier, would be decided no differently today.
As Arendt presciently noted, the “paradox” of human rights is that one
loses all protections the moment one becomes “a human being in gen-
eral . . . representing nothing but [one’s] own absolutely unique
individuality.”247
Perhaps one might ask what would be gained by proceeding under
human rights in such situations. A state engaging in Lopez Burgos-like
conduct is unlikely to be dissuaded by a stern letter from a Special Rap-
porteur: “[i]nternational reporting and monitoring mechanisms have to
rely on the good will, self-criticism and cooperation of the states they scru-
tinise and the committees lack the capacity to sanction state parties for
failing their reporting obligations; hence, the procedures function poorly
as an accountability mechanism.”248 “Pragmatic jurisdiction” over such
cases might serve the useful purpose of publicizing and shaming the perpe-
trator, but then, a regime that poisons its ex-agents might welcome the
sobering effects of such publicity upon others contemplating defection.
These are of course empirical speculations, which may be disproved.
There is, however, the formal objection that one need not bend the con-
cept of human rights when the law possesses other resources for stigma-
tizing those types of conduct. In fact, such atrocities might be something
much, much worse: crimes. The difference between crimes and ordinary
wrongs lies in the fact that the former imply the making of a choice to
exempt oneself unilaterally from the law.249 Because authority is neces-
sary for freedom, the criminal thereby selects herself for punishment by
choosing to subvert it.250 Likewise, a state that acts without any pretense
at legitimacy manifests a will to exempt itself from the law. Thus, the “ef-
246. For a similar argument, see RAZ, supra note 172, at 26 (“Acquiescence seems rele-
vant to the explanation of de facto authority rather than to legitimate authority. To have
effective political control requires, in the circumstances of our world, a high degree of
acquiescence.”).
247. ARENDT, supra note 166, at 302.
248. Schaffer, supra note 153, at 15.
249. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 134 (“The criminal
law serves primarily to protect and vindicate fair terms of interaction. Tort liability is appro-
priate when someone takes a risk with the security of others; criminal liability is reserved for
the narrower class of cases in which someone chooses a risk (or result).”). See generally ch. 5
on “Punishment and the Tort/Crime Distinction.” Strict liability crimes are problematic
under this theory.
250. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 126, at 308-14; IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 97 (§6:321) (Mary Gregor ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) (the criminal
makes “such a crime his rule”).
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fective control of territory” grounds of jurisdiction should be understood
as setting up a presumption that the putative duty-bearer exercises not just
power but also authority over individuals there, which the state cannot be
heard to deny.251 This “normative pull”252 is not for reasons of a policy of
multiplying obligations to advance well-being, but because a state which
openly uses violence to dominate persons is degenerating into a system of
organized barbarism. Such a situation is unsalvageable and must be abol-
ished immediately.253 It must therefore be dealt with under the laws of
war and international criminal law.
C. Territorial Extension and Human Rights Jurisdiction
This Section demonstrates that the strategy of territorial extension de-
scribed in Section III(A) gives rise to the entire spectrum of human rights
obligations, both negative and positive, and argues that this is already rec-
ognized in Strasbourg jurisprudence. To reiterate, the crucial factor for
human rights jurisdiction and therefore obligations is de facto authority, a
condition met simply by creating legal effects. The misconception that
human rights obligations depend instead upon factual effects might be a
result of the fact that the prominent extraterritoriality cases before the
Strasbourg Court have tended to involve military occupation of foreign
countries, or boots on the ground.254 That this is a misconception may be
demonstrated by comparing the two cases that have so far come before the
Court where a human rights violation was alleged purely on the basis of
251. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶¶ 138-39
(2011) (“Where the fact of such domination over the territory is established, it is not neces-
sary to determine whether the Contracting State exercises detailed control over the policies
and actions of the subordinate local administration.”). See Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, Recon-
structing the Effective Control Criterion in Extraterritorial Human Rights Breaches: Direct
Attribution of Wrongfulness, Due Diligence, and Concurrent Responsibility, 36 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 129, 150 (2014) (“Although the factual element of effectiveness recedes, the question of
control remains intact. The sole difference is that it now depends on a presumption that does
not need to be tested . . .”).
252. MILANOVIC, supra note 30, at 171, 263.
253. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Indepen-
dence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 141, 206 ¶ 205 (July 22)
(separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade) (observing that a “State which systematically
perpetrates [certain] grave breaches acts criminally, loses its legitimacy, and ceases to be a
State for the victimized population . . .”).
254. The Court arguably committed this solecism in Al-Skeini when, in discussing
Öcalan v. Turkey, Issa, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom and Medvedyev, it ob-
served that it did “not consider that jurisdiction in the above cases arose solely from the
control exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the
individuals were held. What is decisive is the exercise of physical power and control over the
person in question.” See Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 136 (citing Öcalan v. Turkey, 41 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 45 (2005); Issa, App. No. 31821/96; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 61498/08, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 9 (2010); Medvedyev 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R.). The
fighter pilot in Banković also wielded physical power and control over the people he was
bombing, in that he held absolute power over whether they would live or die. Rather, the
decisive factor in Öcalan and the other cases was not physical power, but authority.
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intangible extraterritorial effects: Ben El Mahi255 and Kovačić.256 Several
authors have remarked upon their apparent irreconcilability.257 It is sub-
mitted that the confusion disappears, if one bears in mind the distinctions
between (1) affecting and governing, and (2) factual effects and legal
effects.258
Ben El Mahi was brought by Moroccan applicants challenging the
publication in Denmark of a newspaper caricaturing the prophet Muham-
mad. Kovačić was brought by Croatian foreign currency depositors at a
Zagreb branch of a Slovenian bank—the Ljubljana Bank—who had been
prevented by Slovenian legislation from withdrawing funds from certain
foreign currency accounts. The accounts had been opened with the
Ljubljana Bank prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia, and had begun to be
frozen from 1998 onwards due to increasing hyperinflation. Following the
breakup, the newly-independent Slovenia legislated to require the
Ljubljana Bank to retain its liability with respect to such accounts held in
branches on Slovenian territory, as well as in branches in the other former
Yugoslav republics. In Ben El Mahi, the Court declared the application
inadmissible by repeating the Banković formula, that is, jurisdiction aris-
ing under Article 1 of the ECHR is the same as jurisdiction at interna-
tional law, and that it obtained outside of state territory only in
exceptional circumstances. In Kovačić, however, the Court held unani-
mously that the matter fell within Slovenia’s human rights jurisdiction,
notwithstanding the then-recent Banković decision. Slovenia had intro-
duced measures “addressing the issue of foreign-currency savings depos-
ited with branches of Slovenian banks outside Slovenian territory . . . ,”259
leading to the “applicants’ position as regards their foreign-currency sav-
ings deposited with the Zagreb Main Branch [being and continuing] to be
affected by that legislative measure.”260 Ultimately, the matter fell within
255. Ben El Mahi v. Denmark, App. No. 5853/06, 2006-XV Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
256. Kovačić v. Slovenia (Admissibility Decision), App. Nos. 44574/98, 45133/98 and
48316/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 1, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-23835 (last visited
Aug. 1, 2016). This paper ignores White v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 42435/02 (Sept.
19, 2006) and Von Hannover v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 42435/02 (June 24, 2006)
because these were defamation cases where the libel arguably took place in the territory of
the ECHR contracting party, even if the claimant was located in Mozambique or Monaco
and Paris respectively. Moreover, the court did not consider the issue of jurisdiction in either
of these cases.
257. See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 13, at 1077-78; Maarten den Heijer, Procedural As-
pects of Shared Responsibility in the European Court of Human Rights, 4. J. INT’L DISP. SET-
TLEMENT 361, 366 n.26 (2013) (citing Kovačić as a ‘problematic’ post-Bankoviæ case where
the Court “appeared to adopt a lower threshold”).
258. See Maarten den Heijer and Rick Lawson, Extraterritorial Human Rights and the
Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’, in GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 179
(Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2013) (examining a group of post-Bankoviæ cases including
Kovačić, concluding that “the factual exercise of authority appeared decisive in enlivening
the State’s human rights obligations”).
259. Kovačić, App. No. 44574/98, 45133/98 and 48316/99, ¶ 4(c).
260. Id. ¶ 5(c).
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Slovenia’s human rights jurisdiction because “the acts of the Slovenian au-
thorities [continued] to produce effects, albeit outside Slovenian territory,
such that Slovenia’s responsibility under the Convention could be
engaged.”261
Note that despite some confusion in the language between responsibil-
ity and jurisdiction, neither the Court nor the applicants invoked the prin-
ciples of state responsibility and attribution. It was never claimed by the
applicants or by the Court that the Ljubljana Bank was either controlled
by or acting upon the instruction of Slovenia, such that the freezing of the
funds was somehow an act of the Slovenian state. Instead, the crucial fac-
tor was that Slovenian legislation had “addressed” the operation of bank
accounts in Croatia, thus creating legal effects there, even if those effects
merely prolonged a pre-existing set of factual circumstances.262 In fact, the
applicants’ complaint was that by enacting such legislation, “Slovenia had
chosen to interfere in [the Ljubljana Bank’s] private-law relationship to
the detriment of non-Slovenian savers.”263
This distinguishes Kovačić from Ben El Mahi, where the Moroccan
applicants could not have claimed that Denmark had altered their legal
situation. Thus, the Slovenian legislation did not merely affect the Croa-
tian depositors-it also governed them. Indeed, given that the freezing of
the accounts had begun before the breakup of Yugoslavia, one may argue
that the Slovenian legislation created no factual effects, but only legal ef-
fects upon the claimants. It is immaterial that the measures were ad-
dressed solely to Slovenian banks. One cannot presume to determine the
legal position of one party to a private relationship without also claiming
authority over the other.264 As a result of the Slovenian measures, the
Croatian depositors were legally barred from reclaiming their deposits ex-
actly as if those measures had been enacted by Croatia. They were in fact
261. Id.
262. Cf. Daniel Augenstein and David Kinley, When human rights responsibilities be-
come duties: the extra-territorial obligations of states that bind corporations, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RE-
SPECT? 271, 287-88 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013). Augenstein and Kinley under-
stand Kovačić to mean that
what is decisive for the determination of extra-territorial human rights obligations
to protect against corporate violations is not the state’s exercise of de jure author-
ity, but its assertion of de facto power over the individual rights-holder. More spe-
cifically, it is an act or omission of the state in relation to a corporate actor that
brings the individual under the power of the state and triggers corresponding obli-
gations to protect his or her human rights against corporate violations.
Such an interpretation is irreconcilable with Al-Skeini, Ben El Mahi or the Bankoviæ rejec-
tion of a human rights effects doctrine, as well as with the facts of the case—the Slovenian
legislation had absolutely no effect upon the factual circumstances of the applicants. They
had been barred from accessing their accounts by the old Yugoslav government itself.
263. Id. ¶ 5(b).
264. See Besson, supra note 31, at 873 (arguing that in order to give rise to human rights
jurisdiction, authority should be “exercised over a large number of interdependent stakes,
and not one time only and over a single matter only”).
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examples of territorial extension par excellence, in that they presumed to
determine the legal rights and duties of persons in Croatia in a way that
could only have been accomplished by a geographically unbounded claim
of prescriptive jurisdiction. Slovenia therefore had human rights obliga-
tions towards the Croatian applicants, including by necessary implication
positive obligations to prevent their rights from violation by the Ljubljana
Bank.265
By extension, where the European Union presumes authority over the
rest of the world—even if only by nonphysical methods, and even if en-
forcement is postponed perhaps indefinitely until entry on EU territory—
it acquires human rights obligations to distant strangers who become the
subjects of its authority, and therefore “its people.” As demonstrated in
Section III, a state or IO may exercise authority by causing legal effects
overseas, without needing its (or its member states’) agents to ever set foot
there.266 Distinctions between the various instrumentalities of authority
are irrelevant. All that matters is that authority is asserted, and that there
is some means eventually of enforcing it.267 The rule in Commune de
Champagne should be overruled for the same reasons as the espace
juridique doctrine in Banković. The European Union’s human rights obli-
gations cover the entire complement of positive and negative obligations,
their specific scope being determined at the merits by the particular facts
of each case. The provisions anchor this in EU law.
CONCLUSION: THE STING OF EMPIRE
This paper has argued that the European Union has perfect, legally
enforceable human rights obligations towards distant strangers, including
265. Kovačić, App. No. 44574/98, 45133/98 and 48316/99, ¶ 5(c). The applicants were
eventually unsuccessful due to new information coming before the Court. Id. ¶¶ 257-69.
266. See MANN, supra note 80, at 14 (suggesting that while “the mere exercise of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction, without any attempt at enforcement, will not normally have to pass the
test of international law. . . it is not difficult to visualize circumstances in which the exercise
of legislative jurisdiction plainly implies the likelihood of enforcement that foreign States are
entitled to challenge its presence on the statute book”).
267. This is not to say that EU territorial extension is always successful. Following the
ATAA judgment, in February 2012, twenty-three countries threatened retaliation including
litigation under the Chicago Convention, reviewing or cancellation of air transport service
agreements, etc. President Obama also signed into law the European Union Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, 49 U.S.C. §40101 (2012), prohibiting U.S. airlines from
complying with the EU emissions trading scheme. These resulted in the Commission defer-
ring enforcement of the Emissions Trading Scheme in November 2012 until after the conclu-
sion of the U.N. International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) in the fall of 2013. Following
the negotiations, the Commission issued a proposal to amend the Emissions Trading Direc-
tive to require emissions-offsetting only for that part of the flight taking place over EU terri-
tory. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Directive 2003/87/EC, COM (2013) 722 final (Nov. 16, 2013), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52013PC0722&from=EN (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
In March 2014, the EU agreed to a further watering-down of its emissions trading scheme for
aviation by scrapping the offsetting requirement for long-haul flights even within EU terri-
tory until 2016, approved a month later by the European Parliament.
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obligations to protect. These obligations arise when the European Union
claims authority over distant strangers, that is, when it changes their legal
position. An examination of the EU law obligation of compliance with
international law demonstrates that it presupposes a notion of interna-
tional law that allows for geographically unbounded prescriptive authority.
The paper then turned to international human rights law to argue that
such authority to prescribe rules for distant strangers gives rise to human
rights obligations, from which positive obligations to protect cannot be ex-
cluded at the outset. The provisions thus contain not just a compliance
principle, but also a “missionary principle”268 requiring the European
Union to advance its values, and indeed live them out in its doings in the
wider world.
The “compliance” reading is reminiscent of Robert Kagan’s portrayal
of the European Union as particularly committed to consensus and multi-
lateralism, while the United States remained “mired in history, exercising
power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules
are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of
a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.”269
International law, according to Kagan’s caricature, is something invented
by Europeans to make up for their lack of an army.270 As Section III
demonstrated, this is pure fantasy. The European Union has a long tradi-
tion of unilateralism that can be reconciled with international law only
with great difficulty. In another sense, however, Kagan was prescient in
speculating that the “transmission of the European miracle to the rest of
the world has become Europe’s new mission civilisatrice,”271 and that
“what many Europeans believe they have to offer the world [is] not
power, but the transcendence of power.”272 Indeed, it offers not power,
but authority. This raises the issue of imperialism, a charge often deflected
even by those who take seriously the European Union’s unilateral promo-
268. This felicitous phrase appears to have been coined by Morten Broberg. See Morten
Broberg, What is the Direction for the EU’s Development Cooperation After Lisbon?—A
Legal Examination, 16 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 539, 548-54 (2011); Morten Broberg, Don’t
Mess with the Missionary Man! On the Principle of Coherence, the Missionary Principle and
the European Union’s Development Policy, in EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY
IN THE POST-LISBON ERA 181-98 (Paul James Cardwell ed., 2012).
269. ROBERT KAGAN, POWER AND PARADISE: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER 3 (2003).
270. See JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2015)
International law is under attack in the United States. Although most lawyers—
and certainly most law school professors—consider international law to be a cen-
tral and profoundly important element of our legal system, many conservative law-
yers are deeply suspicious of international law and the infringement of American
sovereignty that it represents. They want U.S. affairs to be dictated by the Ameri-
can political system and the laws that it produces, not the international legal norms
that flow from faraway European cities like Brussels, Geneva, and The Hague.
271. Id. at 61.
272. Id. at 59-60.
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tion of its values in the world.273 There remains, however, the question of
whether “the EU [should] assume the role of legislator, fee collector, and
lastly exclusive beneficiary of the revenues [of the emissions trading
scheme], for the sake of the entire world.”274
Bearing this in mind, consider the opinion in Salemink, issued mere
months before the ATAA decision, remarkable in that Advocate General
Cruz Villalón went out of his way to present an unnecessary argument
about sovereignty. Salemink involved a Dutch worker on an oilrig in the
continental shelf adjacent to the Netherlands, who had moved his primary
address to Spain. Upon returning to dry land, he discovered his lack of
residence in the Netherlands rendered him no longer eligible for Dutch
invalidity benefits, and brought suit alleging a violation of his freedom of
establishment. The issue was whether EU fundamental freedoms applied
on an oilrig located on the Dutch continental shelf.275 The Advocate Gen-
eral presented the Court with two options: (1) an “easy” option, holding
under established EU precedent that EU fundamental freedoms apply to
work carried out outside of member state territory, if it had a sufficiently
close connection to the member state; and (2) an “innovative” option, of-
fering the Court an opportunity to explain whether the continental shelf
counted as member state territory, and the scope of the member state’s
obligations there under EU law.276 He proceeded to make the following
arguments, which merit close reading:
44. As a physical space under the sovereignty of a State, the con-
cept of territory covers territorial space as such and also airspace
and maritime space. . . . [However,] these areas do not represent
the full extent of the domain in which States can exercise their
sovereign powers, since international law also recognises the exis-
tence of extraterritorial State powers.
45. Just as the area in which State sovereignty can be exercised
does not necessarily coincide exactly with the extent of its terri-
tory, neither do the competences of a State which derive from sov-
273. See Manners, supra note 120, at 253 (“[D]ismiss(ing) the accusation that the EU’s
‘norms’ are really cultural imperialism in disguise [because] the EU often finds itself at odds
with other developed OECD states, such as the US and Japan, as in the case of the abolition
of the death penalty.”); Bradford, supra note 119, at 6 (the “EU’s external regulatory agenda
has. . . emerged largely as an inadvertent by-product of [an] internal goal rather than as a
result of some conscious effort to engage in ‘regulatory imperialism’”).
274. Andrea Gattini, Between Splendid Isolation and Tentative Imperialism: The EU’s
Extension of its Emission Trading Scheme to International Aviation and the ECJ’s Judgment
in the ATA Case, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 977, 982-83 (2012) (the EU emissions trading
scheme “can be understood only if one posits himself (sic) on a universal plane, in a supposed
civitas mundi”).
275. Case C-347/10, Salemink v. Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werk-
nemersverzekeringen, ECLI:EU:C:2012:17, ¶¶ 13-27 (Jan. 17, 2012) (Judgment).
276. Case C-347/10, Salemink v. Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werk-
nemersverzekeringen, ECLI:EU:C:2011:562, ¶¶ 38-39, 41 (Sept. 8, 2011) (Opinion of Advo-
cate General Cruz Villalón).
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ereignty always exhibit the exclusivity and absolute nature which
are characteristic of sovereign power. On the contrary, precisely
as a result of the progressive legal regulation of the international
community, the exercise of sovereignty is subject to variations in
intensity, becoming less pronounced as the connection between
the area of exercise and the territorial base of the State becomes
weaker.
. . . .
47. If State sovereignty over territorial sea is already restricted in
the way I have indicated, the characteristic powers of a sovereign
State diminish progressively the further one travels, so to speak,
from ‘dry land’, such powers becoming reduced in the case of the
continental shelf, as we shall go on to see in more detail, to a
collection of ‘sovereign rights’ intended to be used for particular
purposes, and diluted to the mere exercise of certain freedoms
upon reaching the high seas, where any claim to sovereignty is
quite simply invalid.277
The Advocate General then deduced that since EU competences are con-
ferred by the member states, “EU law will apply to whatever extent the
Member States exercise official authority in the areas of competence con-
ferred on the Union,” subject to limitations specified in the Treaties.278
In the subsequent judgment, the CJEU silently but definitively chose
the “innovative” route, ruling that the applicant’s work carried out on the
Dutch continental shelf was to be regarded as carried out in the territory
of the Netherlands for the purposes of applying EU law, because the
Netherlands had “sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent to
it—albeit functional and limited sovereignty.”279 This makes sense
of the ATAA judgment, which, as argued above, claims a right to pre-
scribe rules in a territorially unbounded fashion. In this regard, Salemink
builds upon existing case law in Kramer,280 Commission v. Spain,281
277. Id. ¶¶ 44-45, 47.
278. Id. ¶¶ 54-55.
279. Case C-347/10, Salemink, ¶ 35 (Judgment).
280. Joined Cases 3,4, and 6/76, Officier van Justitie v. Kramer, 1976 E.C.R. 1279, ¶¶
30-33 (stating EU rules on the conservation of marine biological resources extend not just to
the territorial waters of the Member States, but to the high seas “in so far as the Member
States have similar authority under public international law”).
281. Case C-258/89, Comm’n v. Spain, 1991 E.C.R. I-3977, ¶ 18 (stating EU measures
regulating fishing activities of EU vessels applies on high seas “outside the Community fish-
ing zone”).
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Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL,282 and Commission v.
UK.283
As a description of the concept of sovereignty in international law, the
Salemink opinion might strike readers as being very peculiar. Instead of
borders, the world of Salemink has frontiers, that is, lines on the other side
of which one claims authority that one cannot enforce (yet). Compare the
Salemink opinion, say, to Justice Story’s classic formulation in The
Appollon:
The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories,
except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to
control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its
own jurisdiction. And, however general and comprehensive the
phrases used in our municipal laws may be, they must always be
restricted in construction, to places and persons, upon whom the
Legislature have authority and jurisdiction.284
As a description of an empire, however, the Salemink opinion is al-
most pitch-perfect. Herfried Münkler enumerates the differences between
states and empires as follows:
In states, power is exercised at all times and places in the same
manner and according to consistent principles, and this is increas-
ingly true the more strongly a State has developed as a Rechtss-
taat or Constitutional State. In contrast, the imperial exercise of
power is ordered according to a system of circles and ellipses that
radiate outwards from the centre to the periphery. With these cir-
cles and ellipses, the type and intensity of the self-obligation of
imperial power also changes. It is at its strongest in the centre, in
the heartland of the empire, and here it is comparable to the self-
obligation of power in states. Towards the periphery, however, it
tails off the further away [one goes], without thereby offending
the functional principles of imperial order.285
282. Case C-405/92, Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL, 1993 E.C.R. I-
6133, ¶ 12 (“[W]ith regard to the high seas, the Community has the same rule-making author-
ity in matters within its jurisdiction as that conferred under international law on the state
whose flag the vessel is flying or in which it is registered.”). See also Case C-25/94, Comm’n v.
Council (FAO), 1996 E.C.R. I-469, ¶ 44.
283. Case C-6/04, Comm’n v. U.K., 2005 E.C.R. I-1111, ¶ 117 (rejecting UK’s argument
that Directive 92/43/EEC, [1992] OJ (L 206/7) (Habitats Directive) applied only to UK na-
tional territory and territorial waters and not to the exclusive economic zone, holding instead
that where “the United Kingdom exercises sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone. . .
[i]t follows that the directive must be implemented in that exclusive economic zone”).
284. The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824).
285. Herfried Münkler, Das Prinzip Empire, in EMPIRE AMERIKA: PERSPEKTIVEN
EINER NEUEN WELTORDNUNG 112-13 (Ulrich Speck & Nathan Sznaider eds., 2003) [In
Staaten hat die Machtausübung überall und jederzeit auf die Gleiche Weise und nach den-
selben Prinzipien zu erfolgen, und das um so mehr, je stärker sich der Staat zum Rechts- und
Verfassungsstaat entwickelt hat. Imperiale Machtausübung ist dagegen nach einem System
von Kreisen und Ellipsen geordnet, die vom Zentrum zur Peripherie auseinanderlaufen. Mit
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Although Münkler uses the term “power” [Macht], he must be taken
as meaning normative power or authority: his interest is not in economic
or military might, but “political order.”286 In their depiction of the Euro-
pean Union as a “Cosmopolitan Empire,” Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande
develop Münkler’s insight, defining a state as “a permanent political asso-
ciation based directly on the formal power of command over those subject
to it,” while an empire is a mode of exercising power that “permanently
strives for control over non-subjects.”287 Thus, while a state “seeks to
solve its security and welfare problems by establishing fixed borders,” an
empire “solves them through variable borders and external expansion.”288
In this light, “territorial extension” takes on new shades of meaning.
These peculiar features may have something to do with the European
Union’s unique history and structure. Since the seminal Van Gend en
Loos289 decision, where the CJEU held that the member states had cre-
ated a new legal order by constituting the European Union, the running
theme behind the evolution of EU law has been the breaking down of
borders and the pooling of sovereignty in favor of transnational legal solu-
tions.290 Laurens Ankersmit, Jessica Lawrence and Gareth Davies surmise
that the “EU’s purposive, explicitly evangelical, and law-based identity . . .
gives it an institutional bias towards substantive policy goals, and away
from respect for constitutional boundaries, which more traditionally con-
stituted states, and their representatives in the WTO adjudicatory bodies,
may not entirely welcome or entirely comprehend.”291
diesen Kreisen und Ellipsen verändert sich auch die Art und das Maß der Selbstbindung
imperialer Macht. Im Zentrum, im eigentlichen Kernland des Imperiums, ist sie am stärksten,
und hier gleicht sie dem, was für die Selbstbindung der Macht im Staaten gilt. Zur Peripherie
hingegen nimmt sie immer weiter ab, ohne daß damit gegen die Funktionsprinzipien der
imperialen Ordnung verstoßen würde]. See also MICHAEL DOYLE, EMPIRES 24 (1986)
(describing ‘dispositional’ theories of imperialism as “seeing the roots of empire in imperial-
ism, a force emanating from the metropole like radio waves from a transmitter”).
286. MÜNKLER, supra note 285, at 112 (“Empires and States differ not only in their
attitudes towards borders, but also with regard to the political ordering of each and every
space.” [Imperien und Staaten unterschieden sich nicht nur im Umgang mit Grenzen, son-
dern auch hinsichtlich der einheitlichen politischen Gestaltung des je eigenen Raumes.]).
287. ULRICH BECK AND EDGAR GRANDE, COSMOPOLITAN EUROPE 56 (2007). See also
JAN ZIELONKA, EUROPE AS EMPIRE: THE NATURE OF THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 2-
3 (2006) (“[T]he Union is anything but a state. It has no effective monopoly over the legiti-
mate means of coercion. It has no clearly defined centre of authority. Its territory is not fixed.
Its geographical, administrative, economic, and cultural borders diverge.”); MICHAEL HARDT
& ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 167 (2000) (“[The] fundamental characteristic of imperial sover-
eignty is that its space is always open. . .”).
288. BECK & GRANDE, supra note 287, at 57. See also Jan Zielonka, America and Eu-
rope: two contrasting or parallel empires? 4 J. POL. POWER 337, 345 (2011).
289. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Trans.—en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos
v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 2.
290. See Case C-270/13, Haralambidis v. Calogero Casili, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:1358, ¶
49 (“[T]he Communities were founded with the very aim of overcoming the times of ‘Blut
und Boden’.”) (Opinion of Advocate General Wahl).
291. Ankersmit et al., supra note 123, at 94. Speaking of the EU as a bearer of human
rights obligations given that it is the only political institution known to assert jurisdiction
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As discussed above, territorial extension obtains only in certain policy
areas, outside of which the European Union acts in the ordinary “sover-
eign” style.292 This distinction then provides a principled basis for elabo-
rating the law governing the European Union’s role as a global human
rights actor. In situations where only power is asserted extraterritorially,
the European Union’s legal obligations will be tortious and contractual.293
Such duties of care may be ensured internally through EU administrative
law.294 Where the European Union asserts authority, however, it acquires
fiduciary, or human rights obligations towards the distant strangers sub-
jected to it.
So, here at last are the answers to the two hypothetical situations. In
the first scenario, concerning agricultural subsidies, there are no human
rights obligations toward affected distant farmers, only duties to other po-
litical actors in tort—by analogy to the Trail Smelter/Corfu Channel princi-
ple—or contract, if there are any applicable trade agreements. In the
supermarket merger scenario, however, there may well be enforceable
human rights obligations towards the distant farmers, because EU compe-
tition regulation creates extraterritorial legal effects.
This raises the following question: is there a necessary and unavoida-
ble connection between human rights and (particularly European) imperi-
alism?295 On one hand, the imposition of human rights obligations, and
internationally, Besson remarks that “[u]nless we are ready to start a revolution in the way
we think of and protect individual equality and, hence, not only human rights but democracy
itself, it may be better not to transpose the EU experiment too quickly to other international
institutions of a universal scope.” Samantha Besson, The Bearers of Human Rights’ Duties
and Responsibilities for Human Rights: A Quiet (R)evolution? 32 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 244,
267 (2015).
292. Scott, supra note 89, at 95-96 (noting that in a rare instance, Commission Regula-
tion 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201)1) or the European Market Infrastructure Regulation
(EMIR) relies upon the effects doctrine theory of objective territorial jurisdiction). See
EMIR art. 4(1)(a)(iv), 11(4) (imposing obligations upon parties to a derivatives contract that
has direct, substantial, and foreseeable effects within the EU). See also Joanne Scott, The
New EU “Extraterritoriality”, 51 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1343 (2014) (exploring assertions of
effects-based jurisdiction in recent EU financial legislation).
293. See RAZ, supra note 172, at 5 (“In its relations to those not subject to its authority,
a government is in the same position as you or I or any corporation: that is, its actions must
respect moral bounds which impose on us all certain responsibilities to others. But its duties
to its subjects are more extensive.”).
294. See European Commission, Towards a reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dia-
logue: General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by
the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final (Dec. 11, 2002), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0704:FIN:EN:PDF (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (stating the
Minimum Standards of Consultation adopted by the Commission, requiring consultations to
be open to all interested parties, including third countries and individual stakeholders within
such countries). These guidelines are currently being revised. European Commission, Stake-
holder Consultation Guidelines 2014 – Public Consultation Document, 1 (2014), http://ec
.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/docs/scgl_pc_questionnaire_en.pdf.
295. See ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN
SPAIN, BRITAIN AND FRANCE C. 1500-C. 1800 200 (1995) (“We all internalize our own histo-
ries. The history of European empires in America is one of the reformulation of a constitu-
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socioeconomic rights obligations in particular, might serve as a deterrent
against imperial misadventures. The Netherlands might have been more
circumspect, had it known it would be accountable for events arising out
of its manning a checkpoint in Iraq. On the other hand, human rights may
obviously advance imperial agendas. In the example of the hypothetical
merger, the imposition of human rights obligations upon the European
Union towards Ruritanian farmers does not cure, but only exacerbates the
apparent infringement of Ruritania’s sovereignty. Then again, unilateral
assertions of authority might be the only way to solve the problems plagu-
ing the provision of global public goods.296 Are such assertions of author-
ity legitimate? If not, might there nevertheless be legal obligations,
however limited, to obey them anyway?297
This Article avoided these questions, because they arise mainly when
dealing with the European Union’s competences to promote and advance
human rights. Instead, our limited brief was to describe the European
Union’s human rights obligations towards distant strangers. In this regard,
the objections from sovereignty and self-determination are inappropriate
because interposed too late. While it would indeed reduce Ruritania’s
freedom of action for the Commission to block a supermarket merger on
the basis of violations of the human rights of Ruritanian coffee farmers,
that objection should have been made before the European Union as-
sumed the role of competition regulator for the world. Of course, it may
tive element in European cultural and political thinking: the belief in the possibility of a
universal human code of conduct.”).
296. See Krisch, supra note 88, at 3-5 (arguing that collective failures to provide global
public goods has resulted in the weakening of state consent in international law); Daniel
Bodansky, What’s So Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment? 11 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 339, 345 (2000) (arguing that “unilateral action, though questionable from a process
standpoint, may nevertheless be justified by its substantive objectives and results”). Consider
Benvenisti’s argument that sovereigns have other-regarding duties to distant strangers af-
fected by their policies partly on the basis that the right to exclude such strangers from their
land, resources and government is justifiable only if those individuals have “enough and as
good left in common.” Eyal Benvenisti, supra note 169, at 311 n.87 (citing JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §33 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690). See also Evan
J. Criddle, Standing for Human Rights Abroad, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2015) (arguing,
from a Grotian conception of sovereigns as fiduciaries of humanity, that states have standing
as ‘fiduciaries of necessity’ to take action to protect human rights from violations abroad,
such competence being constrained and regulated by fiduciary principles).
297. Consider the duties owed by the population of an occupied territory to an occupy-
ing force, which is legally obliged to establish authority to keep public order. See Eyal
Benvenisti, Occupation and Territorial Administration, (GlobalTrust Working Paper Series
No. 11/2015), http://globaltrust.tau.ac.il/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Occupation-and-territo-
rial-administration-WPS-11-20151.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2016); BENVENISTI, supra note 206,
at 72-76, 245. For an interesting analogy from the private law, consider the Roman negoti-
orum gestio, governing situation where a person, completely unbidden, takes charge of and
administers certain property or even mere affairs of another. While she is accountable to the
principal for any losses (actio negotiorum gestorum directa), she is entitled to reasonable pay-
ment if her administration of the property results in a windfall (actio negotiorum gestorum
contraria). REINHARD ZIMMERMAN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 440-45 (1996).
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be difficult to imagine the Commission would ever block, or even place
conditions upon, a merger for the sake of distant strangers. The most obvi-
ous hurdles are the European Union’s restrictive requirements for stand-
ing to bring judicial review, and the Commission and the General Court’s
reliance upon the effects doctrine rather than the CJEU’s implementation
test. However, it would be hypocritical for the European Union to govern
distant strangers in effect, but then deny any accountability towards them.
The burden is squarely upon the European Union to demonstrate by what
right it presumes to prescribe law for the entire world.
